{
  "family": "hydrapos",
  "sample_count": 14,
  "category": "pos_malware",
  "description": "HydraPOS (classified in threat intelligence feeds as Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS and Trojan-POS.Win32.Hydra) is a specialized Point-of-Sale (POS) memory scraping malware family engineered to infiltrate retail, hospitality, and payment processing endpoints. Injected into memory spaces of payment handling processes (such as POS terminal transaction executables), HydraPOS continuously scans process memory buffers using regular expressions matching Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe payment card data (including primary account numbers, cardholder names, expiration dates, and service codes) before the data is encrypted for transit. The harvested card data is stored in memory, encrypted using XOR/AES, and exfiltrated over covert HTTP/HTTPS channels or DNS tunneling to remote cybercrime infrastructure.",
  "cta": "Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.",
  "aliases": [
    "Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS",
    "Trojan-POS.Win32.Hydra",
    "PWS:Win32/HydraPOS",
    "HydraPOS Memory Scraper",
    "Win32/HydraPOS"
  ],
  "enrichment_level": "curated_sourced",
  "faq": [
    {
      "@type": "Question",
      "name": "What is Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS?",
      "acceptedAnswer": {
        "@type": "Answer",
        "text": "HydraPOS is a Point-of-Sale (POS) RAM scraping trojan that steals credit and debit card data directly from process memory."
      }
    },
    {
      "@type": "Question",
      "name": "How does HydraPOS harvest payment card numbers?",
      "acceptedAnswer": {
        "@type": "Answer",
        "text": "It hooks POS transaction processes and uses regex algorithms to extract Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe data from memory buffers."
      }
    },
    {
      "@type": "Question",
      "name": "Why is RAM scraping effective against payment encryption?",
      "acceptedAnswer": {
        "@type": "Answer",
        "text": "Because card data temporarily exists in plaintext in RAM at the exact moment of swiping before point-to-point encryption occurs."
      }
    },
    {
      "@type": "Question",
      "name": "How does HydraPOS exfiltrate stolen card numbers?",
      "acceptedAnswer": {
        "@type": "Answer",
        "text": "It packages card data into encrypted archives and exfiltrates them via HTTP/HTTPS POST or covert DNS query channels."
      }
    },
    {
      "@type": "Question",
      "name": "How can retail organizations protect POS systems from HydraPOS?",
      "acceptedAnswer": {
        "@type": "Answer",
        "text": "Implement Point-to-Point Encryption (P2PE), deploy application whitelisting on POS terminals, and enforce strict PCI-DSS compliance."
      }
    }
  ],
  "faq_count": 5,
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1055",
    "T1005",
    "T1057",
    "T1547.001",
    "T1041",
    "T1071.001"
  ],
  "cisa_advisory": null,
  "last_updated": "2026-10-15",
  "mitre_attack_detail": [
    {
      "id": "T1005",
      "name": "Data from Local System (RAM Scraping)",
      "tactic": "Collection"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1057",
      "name": "Process Discovery",
      "tactic": "Discovery"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1048.003",
      "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol",
      "tactic": "Exfiltration"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1543.003",
      "name": "Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service",
      "tactic": "Persistence"
    },
    {
      "id": "T1078",
      "name": "Valid Accounts (Initial Access to POS Network)",
      "tactic": "Initial Access"
    }
  ],
  "containment_steps": [
    "Instantly sever the network connection of any suspected infected POS terminal, but leave it powered on to preserve RAM evidence.",
    "Initiate a PCI forensic investigation; capture a live memory image of the infected terminal to analyze the scraping mechanism and extract the unencrypted C2 configuration.",
    "Analyze firewall logs to identify the external IP addresses the POS terminal was communicating with, and block them.",
    "Force a global password reset for all remote access systems (RDP, LogMeIn, VNC) used by vendors or IT staff to access the retail network."
  ],
  "what_to_avoid": [
    "Do not reboot the POS terminal; doing so destroys the volatile memory evidence (RAM) crucial for understanding the attack.",
    "Avoid using the infected terminal for any further transactions; every swipe is actively being stolen."
  ],
  "target_industries": [
    "Global / Opportunistic"
  ],
  "motivation": "Opportunistic",
  "threat_actors": [
    "Unknown / Cybercriminal"
  ],
  "target_geographies": [
    "Global"
  ],
  "attack_stage": [
    "execution",
    "persistence"
  ],
  "ecosystem": [
    "windows_pe"
  ],
  "is_emerging": false,
  "sources": [
    {
      "name": "Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS",
      "url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS"
    },
    {
      "name": "Trend Micro Security Research - POS RAM Scraper Analysis",
      "url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.hydrapos"
    },
    {
      "name": "MITRE ATT&CK - Data from Local System (T1005)",
      "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/"
    }
  ],
  "target_platforms": [
    "Windows 11",
    "Windows 10",
    "Windows 7"
  ]
}