Lumma
Table of Contents
Overview
Lumma Stealer (also tracked in threat telemetry as LummaC2, LummaStealer, and Trojan:Win32/Lumma) is a premier C-language information stealer that emerged in late 2022 and rapidly rose to become the dominant stealer framework on the cybercrime underground by 2024. Authored natively in C by a threat actor operating under the alias 'Lumma', the malware was explicitly engineered to optimize execution speed, minimize binary overhead, and withstand modern endpoint detection and response (EDR) heuristics. Lumma is sold under a multi-tier Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) licensing model, offering tiered access ranging from standard binary builds to corporate enterprise licenses featuring advanced polymorphic crypters and proactive domain rotation. Lumma executes deep credential harvesting across Chromium and Gecko browsers, extracting encrypted DPAPI-protected Master Keys to decrypt stored credentials, session cookies, and autofill vaults offline. It aggressively targets over 70 browser cryptocurrency extensions, desktop Web3 wallets, KeePass password databases, VPN profiles, and multi-factor authentication browser tokens. Lumma is heavily distributed via sophisticated ClearFake and fake-update drive-by campaigns, YouTube video description links promoting AI software lures, Discord CDN distribution, and weaponized archive lures exploiting CVE-2023-38831 and Windows SmartScreen defense evasion flaw CVE-2024-21412. Its C2 infrastructure incorporates high-resilience control protocols: the binary employs multi-layered XOR and AES-string decryption, anti-virtual-machine checks utilizing CPUID and instruction timing, and dynamic C2 communication featuring decoy HTTP POST requests sent to legitimate web services alongside genuine command servers to obstruct network perimeter triage.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Lummac2_V1 · Lummac2_V2 · Lummac2_V3_Decoy_C2 · Lumma_Corporate_Build
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1555.003 · T1539 · T1005 · T1082 · T1083 · T1071.001 · T1027 · T1497.001 · T1553.005
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-FDM | File Data Monitoring | Detect | T1005 | Deploy Data Loss Prevention (DLP) agents to audit sensitive file access and block unauthorized batch file copying. |
D3-BDA | Binary De-obfuscation & Unpacking | Analyze | T1027 | Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation. |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-SDA | System Discovery Analysis | Detect | T1082 | Alert on rapid enumerations of systeminfo, hostname, and registry hardware trees in short intervals. |
D3-FDA | File Directory Access Auditing | Detect | T1083 | Audit and alert on high-frequency recursive directory queries executed by non-system and unclassified binaries. |
D3-EED | Execution Environment Detection | Detect | T1497.001 | Configure malware sandboxes to emulate legitimate hardware metrics, realistic mouse movements, and valid system uptimes. |
D3-CVH | Credential Vault Hardening | Harden | T1555.003 | Enable DPAPI master key audit logging and isolate browser SQLite database files within virtualization-based security containers. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2024-21412 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2023-38831 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
31737be70d8a571025b508f72a4209bf270b8a098b671a52028ddc87c14a22adb508f72a4209bf270b8a098b671a52028ddc87c14a22ad31737be70d8a5710259bf270b8a098b671a52028ddc87c14a22ad31737be70d8a571025b508f72a420
Delivery vectors
ClearFake drive-by compromise injecting fake browser update overlays on compromised WordPress sitesMalicious internet shortcuts (.url) exploiting Windows SmartScreen defense evasion vulnerability CVE-2024-21412Spear-phishing archives with weaponized files exploiting WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831
Persistence mechanisms
Runs as an ephemeral in-memory payload exiting immediately after exfiltration to evade detectionScheduled task execution via schtasks for enterprise-level persistenceRegistry Run key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_LUMMA_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Lumma"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "lumma" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "lumma stealer" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "lummac2" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "lummastealer" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "trojan:win32/lumma" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "win32/lummastealer" ascii wide nocase
$s7 = "lumma.c2" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Lumma (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: 774b2585-9f47-5982-a608-cc0972e92f9f
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Lumma malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting, master
key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/lumma
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1539
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1083
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \rundll32.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
- \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
- \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
- vaultcmd.exe /list
- dpapi
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_LUMMA_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Lumma tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "lumma" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
References & External Analysis
- Outpost24: LummaC2 Stealer Technical In-Depth Dissection
- Mandiant Threat Intelligence: The Ascendance of Lumma Stealer
- Trend Micro: ClearFake Drive-By Campaigns Delivering LummaC2
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Detecting Lumma Stealer and SmartScreen Bypasses
- Search "lumma" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "lumma" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "lumma" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Lumma Stealer and why is it so prominent?
Lumma Stealer (LummaC2) is a lightweight, high-performance information stealer written in C. It emerged in 2022 and quickly dominated the MaaS stealer ecosystem due to its aggressive evasion techniques, fast execution, and frequent feature updates.
How does Lumma bypass Windows SmartScreen?
Lumma campaigns heavily weaponized vulnerability CVE-2024-21412, utilizing specially crafted internet shortcut (.url) files pointing to remote WebDAV servers to execute malicious scripts without triggering SmartScreen warning prompts.
What is the ClearFake infection vector associated with Lumma?
ClearFake is a drive-by compromise framework that displays fake web browser update overlays on compromised legitimate websites, convincing victims to download and run malicious installers containing Lumma Stealer.
How does Lumma evade network detection during C2 communication?
Lumma sends decoy HTTP POST requests to legitimate domains alongside requests to active C2 servers. This traffic flooding confuses automated network sandbox analysis and thwarts signature-based intrusion detection.
What types of Web3 and crypto assets does Lumma target?
Lumma targets over 70 cryptocurrency browser extensions (MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet) and desktop wallets, extracting wallet databases, local storage files, and keystore records to siphon digital assets.
What defensive measures effectively block Lumma Stealer?
Deploy modern EDR solutions capable of detecting in-memory unhooking and DPAPI master key decryption, apply February 2024 Windows cumulative updates patching CVE-2024-21412, and restrict executable launches from user temporary directories.
How does Lumma Stealer leverage control flow flattening and string XOR encryption to evade static antivirus engines?
Lumma Stealer employs advanced compiler-level control flow flattening, inserting convoluted state machines, bogus switch dispatchers, and dead code blocks to break linear disassembly in reverse-engineering tools like IDA Pro and Ghidra. All critical strings—including API names, targeted browser paths, and C2 parameters—are stored as encrypted byte arrays decoded only in temporary stack buffers via dynamic XOR keys.
What browser extension wallet IDs and 2FA desktop apps does Lumma Stealer prioritize for extraction?
Lumma maintains an extensive targeting dictionary containing over 70 unique Google Chrome extension identifiers corresponding to popular Web3 cryptocurrency wallets (including MetaMask, Phantom, Coinbase Wallet, TronLink, and Binance Wallet). In addition, Lumma searches the victim's filesystem for desktop authenticator applications (such as Authy Desktop) and password managers (Bitwarden, 1Password) to harvest master vault archives.
How do I remove the Lumma Infostealer from Windows?
Manual removal of Lumma is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Lumma a virus or a Infostealer?
Lumma is classified as a Infostealer. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Lumma typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Lumma infection?
Symptoms of Lumma can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Infostealers
Want to prevent Lumma and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: InfoStealer Protection & Remediation.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/lumma.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.