Tick

Overview

Executive Summary

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

• Initial Access: The group frequently relies on zero-day vulnerabilities in regional enterprise software (such as popular Japanese asset management solutions) or highly targeted spear-phishing emails utilizing exploit-laden Office documents.
• Custom Malware Arsenal: Tick deploys a variety of proprietary malware families, including Daserf (a sophisticated backdoor used for lateral movement and command execution), Minzen (a downloader), Datper (a RAT), and Xxmm. These tools are heavily obfuscated and frequently updated to evade signature-based detection.
• Living off the Land (LotL): To maintain absolute stealth during lateral movement and data exfiltration, Tick operators heavily utilize legitimate administrative tools (like PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and PsExec) and legitimate cloud storage services to exfiltrate stolen data, blending their activities with normal administrative traffic.

Threat Assessment

Defense and Resilience Strategies

• Behavioral EDR and Threat Hunting: Defending against Tick requires mature EDR capabilities and active threat hunting. Security teams must monitor for anomalous usage of administrative tools (LotL techniques), unusual WMI queries, and unexpected lateral movement across the network.
• Vulnerability Management: Given their history of exploiting regional enterprise software, organizations must maintain strict, accelerated patch management protocols, particularly for edge devices and specialized corporate applications.
• Network Segmentation and DLP: Implement rigorous network segmentation to contain potential breaches. Deploy robust Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions to monitor for the bulk extraction of sensitive documents or CAD files to unauthorized external or cloud storage endpoints.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• APT.Tick
• Bronze Butler
• REDBALDknight
• Stalker Panda

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.001: Restrict execution of PowerShell. Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and Script Block Logging.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_TICK_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Tick"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "tick" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "apt.tick" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "bronze butler" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "redbaldknight" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "stalker panda" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Tick (Backdoor) Execution & Triage
id: df1427c3-2587-507d-b140-d9486fafd649
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Tick malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading, and
  remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/tick
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.backdoor
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1192
- attack.t1059_001
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1567_002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_TICK_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Tick tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "tick" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate the compromised host from internal LAN and WAN environments to cut off interactive remote shell sessions established by Tick.
2. Inspect active socket listeners and outbound established network connections ('netstat -ano') to identify and sever covert TCP/UDP channels used by Tick.
3. Scan Windows Services, Scheduled Tasks, and Startup folders to locate and eliminate persistent backdoor listeners configured by Tick.
4. Invalidate all active VPN profiles, local administrator credentials, and session tokens that may have been harvested by the Tick operator.
5. Re-image the affected host using a validated golden image prior to reconnecting it to enterprise network segments.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not attempt to interact with or send messages through the Tick remote terminal, as this alerts the attacker and may cause them to execute destructive anti-forensic commands.
2. Avoid relying solely on static file signatures, as Tick payloads frequently execute reflectively in memory without writing binaries to disk.

References & External Analysis

• Search "tick" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "tick" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "tick" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Backdoor)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Zxshell
• Pterodo
• Opanki
• Koutodoor
• Shell
• Doublefantasy
• Atomicrat
• Keydoor

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/tick.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.