0Y0Auaszpblb

Overview

0Y0Auaszpblb (classified in antivirus detection telemetry under designations including Ransom:Win32/0Y0Auaszpblb, Ransom.Win32.0Y0Auaszpblb, and Win32/0Y0Auaszpblb) is a crypto-ransomware designed to locate, encrypt, and hold hostage high-value user documents, database stores, and system files. Disseminated across enterprise networks and consumer workstations via social engineering, phishing attachments, malicious drive-by downloads, or weaponized software cracks, 0Y0Auaszpblb executes an initial reconnaissance phase upon system ingress. The binary evaluates host privileges, detects active hypervisors and sandbox environments to evade behavioral analysis, and establishes resilient autostart persistence by configuring registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or registering background Windows services. Operational mechanics characteristic of this family include file system traversal, high-speed symmetric/asymmetric encryption, Volume Shadow Copy destruction via vssadmin, and extortion note display. Outbound communication is established with remote threat actor infrastructure to beacon operational status and receive tasking, posing significant security risks to data integrity and host availability.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Ransom:Win32/0Y0Auaszpblb
• Ransom.Win32.0Y0Auaszpblb
• Win32/0Y0Auaszpblb

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_0Y0AUASZPBLB_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for 0Y0Auaszpblb"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "0y0auaszpblb" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "ransom:win32/0y0auaszpblb" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "ransom.win32.0y0auaszpblb" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/0y0auaszpblb" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - 0y0auaszpblb (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: 1ee0ce4c-bf6d-5b42-8884-e2c31f2f4eac
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the 0y0auaszpblb malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot
  status tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/0y0auaszpblb
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1489
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1083
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_0Y0AUASZPBLB_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for 0Y0Auaszpblb tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "0y0auaszpblb" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate the endpoint immediately; polymorphic droppers are typically the first stage of a much larger attack sequence.
2. Rely on EDR behavioral rules (e.g., blocking suspicious process injections) rather than relying on the AV signature that caught this specific variant.
3. Analyze DNS logs for the infected host to identify the algorithm used by the DGA, and block the successful connections.
4. Submit the memory dump or the quarantined file to a dynamic sandbox to identify the *actual* payload it was attempting to deploy.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not waste time searching the enterprise for the specific file hash associated with '0y0auaszpblb'; it is likely unique to that single machine.
2. Avoid trying to manually block every domain generated by a DGA; the attacker can generate them faster than you can block them.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Ransom:Win32/0Y0Auaszpblb
• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - Ransom.Win32.0Y0Auaszpblb
• MITRE ATT&CK - Enterprise Techniques
• Search "0y0auaszpblb" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "0y0auaszpblb" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "0y0auaszpblb" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Detroie
• Tilken
• Avira
• Artel
• Pitin
• Arhost
• Genericrxed
• Candybox

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/0y0auaszpblb.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.