Avkiller

Category: ransomware · Aliases: Ransom:Win32/Avkiller, Ransom.Win32.Avkiller, Win32/Avkiller · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 1 · Enrichment: curated_sourced · Updated: 2026-10-16
Category: RansomwareStatus: Automated SignaturePlatform: WINDOWS_PEStage: Defense Evasion, ImpactActor: Unknown / CybercriminalIndustry: Healthcare, Critical Infrastructure, EnterpriseMotivation: Financial Extortion🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server 2022
Executive Summary
Avkiller (classified in antivirus detection telemetry under designations including Ransom:Win32/Avkiller, Ransom.Win32.Avkiller, and Win32/Avkiller) is a crypto-ransomware designed to locate, encrypt, and hold hostage high-value user documents, database stores, and system files.

Table of Contents

Overview

Avkiller (classified in antivirus detection telemetry under designations including Ransom:Win32/Avkiller, Ransom.Win32.Avkiller, and Win32/Avkiller) is a crypto-ransomware designed to locate, encrypt, and hold hostage high-value user documents, database stores, and system files. Disseminated across enterprise networks and consumer workstations via social engineering, phishing attachments, malicious drive-by downloads, or weaponized software cracks, Avkiller executes an initial reconnaissance phase upon system ingress. The binary evaluates host privileges, detects active hypervisors and sandbox environments to evade behavioral analysis, and establishes resilient autostart persistence by configuring registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or registering background Windows services. Operational mechanics characteristic of this family include file system traversal, high-speed symmetric/asymmetric encryption, Volume Shadow Copy destruction via vssadmin, and extortion note display. Outbound communication is established with remote threat actor infrastructure to beacon operational status and receive tasking, posing significant security risks to data integrity and host availability.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-KPAKernel Patching & Privilege AuditingHardenT1068Enforce rapid OS kernel patch cycles and deploy Exploit Guard protections to block memory corruption and elevation exploits.
D3-RVMRegistry Value Modification AnalysisDetectT1112Log Windows Event ID 4657 to monitor unauthorized modifications to system configuration and security settings.
D3-STASecurity Tool Anti-Tamper EnforcementHardenT1562.001Block unauthorized modification of antivirus registry flags and prevent stopping security agent services.

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_AVKILLER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Avkiller"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "avkiller" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "ransom:win32/avkiller" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "ransom.win32.avkiller" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/avkiller" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Avkiller (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: c9565fb4-c156-5b54-a6cc-a44ad6eab299
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Avkiller malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/avkiller
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1489
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1083
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_AVKILLER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Avkiller tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "avkiller" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

Containment & Response Steps

Home Users: If you suspect a malware infection on your personal device, disconnect from the internet immediately and run a full system scan with your antivirus software (see our TotalAV Antivirus & Security Support Guide). The steps below are intended for IT professionals responding to enterprise incidents.

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

  1. Isolate the endpoint IMMEDIATELY; the attacker is likely deploying ransomware the moment the AV is disabled.
  2. If the EDR agent is offline, rely on network-level isolation (e.g., disabling the switch port or VPN session).
  3. Investigate how the attacker gained the Administrative privileges necessary to execute the Avkiller tool.
  4. Review the memory of the affected host to identify what secondary payloads were executed while the defenses were down.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

  1. Do not assume a 'Defender disabled' alert is just a configuration error or user mistake if it correlates with other suspicious activity.
  2. Avoid relying solely on the AV agent to report its own death; use external monitoring to detect when endpoints suddenly stop sending logs.

References & External Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Ransom:Win32/Avkiller?

Avkiller is a ransomware threat designed to infiltrate Windows systems and execute unauthorized operations without user consent.

How does Avkiller compromise target systems?

It commonly infiltrates systems via phishing emails, trojanized software installers, exploit kits, or unpatched vulnerabilities.

What persistence mechanisms does Avkiller utilize?

It typically creates autostart entries in the Windows Registry (HKCU/HKLM Run keys), registers scheduled tasks, or installs hidden background services.

What risks does Avkiller pose to an enterprise?

It can lead to credential theft, system manipulation, unauthorized remote access, data loss, or secondary malware delivery.

How can administrators detect and eliminate Avkiller?

Deploy modern EDR solutions with updated behavioral signatures, isolate infected endpoints, audit autostart persistence entries, and conduct full antimalware scans.

How do I remove Avkiller from Windows?

Manual removal of Avkiller is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

What are the main symptoms of a Avkiller infection?

Symptoms of Avkiller can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against Ransomwares

Want to prevent Avkiller and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Ransomware Containment & Incident Response.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/avkiller.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.