D0F3570C

Overview

Trojan:Win32/D0f3570c (or similar hash-based naming conventions) represents a generic or heuristic detection by an antivirus engine. Instead of identifying a specific malware family (like Emotet or Qakbot), this designation means the AV engine flagged the file as malicious based on its behavior, a machine-learning model, or a partial signature match. It operates as a generic loader or trojan, designed to establish a foothold and download further payloads (`T1105`).

Understanding Generic/Hash-Based Detections
To an end-user, the infection process is identical to any other trojan—often silent and hidden. For a SOC analyst, a generic detection like 'D0f3570c' requires deeper investigation because the AV engine does not know the ultimate intent of the file. It is a red flag indicating malicious behavior, but lacks the context needed to predict whether the follow-on attack will be ransomware, a banking trojan, or a cryptominer.

Execution and Evasion Strategies
Because it is a generic detection, the execution mechanics can vary wildly. However, it typically arrives via spearphishing (`T1566.001`) or software vulnerabilities (`T1190`). Once executed, the trojan will attempt to establish persistence (usually via Registry Run keys or Scheduled Tasks) and use process injection (`T1055`) to hide its activity within legitimate Windows processes like `svchost.exe`. Its primary goal is to reach out to a C2 server to download and execute its true, secondary payload.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Since the name is generic, analysts must rely on behavioral IoCs generated by EDR. Look for unexpected child processes spawning from Office applications or web browsers (indicating the initial exploit). Monitor for unsigned executables writing to the Windows Registry Run keys, or executing out of temporary directories (`%Temp%`, `%AppData%`). Network IoCs will involve the initial beaconing activity to unknown, newly registered domains or direct IP addresses.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_D0F3570C_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for D0F3570C"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "d0f3570c" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - D0f3570c (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: f4f5354e-96a2-5726-8d13-1c010acced4a
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the D0f3570c malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/d0f3570c
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_D0F3570C_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for D0F3570C tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "d0f3570c" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate the endpoint immediately, as the generic trojan is likely attempting to download a more destructive payload.
2. Extract the file (if available in quarantine) and submit it to a malware sandbox (like Cuckoo or Any.Run) to determine its true behavior and C2 infrastructure.
3. Use EDR to trace the process tree backwards to identify how the generic trojan was initially executed (e.g., which email attachment was opened).
4. Hunt across the enterprise for the specific file hash and any C2 domains identified during sandbox analysis.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not dismiss a generic detection as a false positive without verifying the file's behavior; AV engines often use generic names for brand-new, zero-day threats.
2. Avoid relying on the AV name ('D0f3570c') for threat intelligence gathering; focus on the file hashes and network indicators instead.

References & External Analysis

• Search "d0f3570c" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "d0f3570c" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "d0f3570c" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Malushka
• Xnhmeb
• Basine
• Bmgfrznl2Gfaa
• Pccleaners
• Genericrxfp
• Creprote
• Shaskooth

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/d0f3570c.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.