Donut

Overview

Executive Summary

Technical Architecture and Exploitation

• Shellcode Generation: The attacker uses the Donut framework to convert their primary executable payload (e.g., a .NET assembly or a compiled C++ binary) into raw, position-independent shellcode.
• AMSI Bypass: Donut is specifically engineered to bypass the Windows Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC). The generated shellcode often includes built-in routines to unhook or patch these defensive APIs in memory before executing the primary payload.
• In-Memory Execution: The resulting Donut shellcode is typically injected into a legitimate, running process (process hollowing or thread hijacking) via a simple dropper. Because the shellcode executes entirely in memory (RAM) without dropping the original executable to the hard drive, it effectively bypasses traditional, file-based static antivirus scanning.

Threat Impact

Defense and Resilience Strategies

• Behavioral EDR Monitoring: Static scanning is highly ineffective against Donut. Defenses must rely on advanced Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions configured to monitor for cross-process memory injection, unusual thread creation within system processes, and anomalous API usage (e.g., `CreateRemoteThread`, `VirtualAllocEx`).
• AMSI Monitoring: Ensure EDR solutions are actively monitoring for attempts to patch or unhook the AMSI functions (e.g., `AmsiScanBuffer`).
• Memory Forensics: When a suspicious process is identified, responders must capture and analyze a live memory dump to extract the injected Donut shellcode and reverse-engineer the underlying payload.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• HackTool.Donut
• Tool.DonutShellcode
• Riskware.Donut

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_DONUT_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Donut"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "donut" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hacktool.donut" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "tool.donutshellcode" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "riskware.donut" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Donut (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: d0318d2c-bfb8-57aa-9fa3-5f1b843b1251
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Donut malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/donut
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1027_005
- attack.t1620
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_DONUT_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Donut tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "donut" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate affected host(s) from the internal network (disconnect physical Ethernet and disable Wi-Fi/Bluetooth) to prevent Donut from spreading laterally or encrypting network-attached storage (NAS) and shared SMB volumes.
2. Preserve volatile system memory (RAM capture) on a representative endpoint before attempting a reboot or power-down, as Donut symmetric encryption keys or uncompiled payload components may still reside in memory.
3. Audit process execution logs and terminate active scripting interpreters (e.g. PowerShell, CMD, WScript) or commands executing 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows' or 'wbadmin' used by Donut to inhibit recovery.
4. Investigate the initial compromise vector (such as exposed RDP instances, spearphishing attachments, or vulnerable edge gateways) and enforce an immediate credential reset for all compromised Active Directory accounts.
5. Restore critical assets and databases exclusively from verified, air-gapped, or immutable offline backups once the Donut binary and related persistence hooks are eradicated.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not restart or power cycle infected systems prematurely; doing so destroys volatile RAM encryption keys and may trigger bootloader locking logic embedded in Donut.
2. Avoid negotiating or paying the extortion demand without prior forensic evaluation and consultation with incident response specialists, as payment does not guarantee data recovery.
3. Do not connect clean backup drives or external storage to the affected network until Donut eradication is completely verified.

References & External Analysis

• Search "donut" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "donut" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "donut" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Glukelira
• Delikle
• Libie
• Xxycff
• Saturn
• Ridapi
• Isnev
• Gasti

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/donut.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.