Hpcubestlr
Table of Contents
Overview
Trojan:Win32/Hpcubestlr is a highly specialized Information Stealer (Info-Stealer) specifically engineered to locate, extract, and exfiltrate highly sensitive data from compromised endpoints. Unlike broad-spectrum trojans, Hpcubestlr targets high-value data repositories: saved web browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet files (`T1114`), system configuration files, and authentication tokens (like Discord or Telegram session hijacking).
Understanding Hpcubestlr (Info-Stealers)
To an end-user, the infection is entirely invisible. For a security team, Hpcubestlr represents an immediate, catastrophic breach of confidentiality. The stolen credentials are often immediately utilized by the attackers for lateral movement, or packaged and sold on dark web marketplaces (like Genesis Market or 2easy) to Initial Access Brokers.
Execution and Extraction Mechanics
Hpcubestlr is distributed through various vectors: cracked software portals, spear-phishing (`T1566.001`), or dropped by other malware (like a botnet). Upon execution, it does not typically establish long-term persistence; its goal is 'smash and grab.' It rapidly scans the file system for known credential store locations (`T1555.003`), utilizing built-in SQLite parsing to extract passwords from Chrome, Edge, and Firefox without requiring user interaction. It specifically targets cryptocurrency extensions (like MetaMask) and desktop wallets (like Electrum or Bitcoin Core). It packages this data into a compressed archive (`T1560.001`) and exfiltrates it immediately to a C2 server, often via a Telegram bot API or a hardcoded FTP server.
Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is the total compromise of the user's digital identity and the high probability of subsequent enterprise breaches if corporate credentials were stolen. Host-based IoCs include EDR alerts for anomalous file reads targeting `AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data` or cryptocurrency wallet directories by an unknown executable. File integrity monitoring may detect the sudden creation and deletion of ZIP or RAR archives in the `%Temp%` directory. Network IoCs include a sudden burst of outbound HTTPS traffic (the exfiltration) immediately following the execution of an untrusted file.
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-EAF | Egress Analysis and Filtering | Isolate | T1041 | Enforce perimeter TLS inspection and alert on anomalous outbound data volume ratios transmitting over active C2 channels. |
D3-EAM | Email Access Monitoring | Detect | T1114 | Monitor Graph API and MAPI email harvesting routines and alert on bulk email downloads originating from unusual IP addresses. |
D3-CVH | Credential Vault Hardening | Harden | T1555.003 | Enable DPAPI master key audit logging and isolate browser SQLite database files within virtualization-based security containers. |
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_HPCUBESTLR_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Hpcubestlr"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "hpcubestlr" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Hpcubestlr (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: d18a8b1b-a2bc-5047-81a8-78291a7f6a8f
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Hpcubestlr malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary
user directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/hpcubestlr
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1114
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1560_001
- attack.t1041
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \wscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- AppData\Local\Temp
- -WindowStyle Hidden
- /e:jscript
- bitsadmin /transfer
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_HPCUBESTLR_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Hpcubestlr tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "hpcubestlr" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Assume ALL credentials stored on the infected machine, or typed during the infection window, are compromised. Initiate immediate password resets.
- Isolate the machine to prevent any further data exfiltration, although the 'smash and grab' is usually completed within minutes of execution.
- Revoke and regenerate all active session tokens (e.g., VPN tokens, Slack/Discord tokens, AWS keys) that were present on the machine.
- Analyze the exfiltration network traffic to determine exactly what data was successfully transmitted to the attacker.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not assume the machine is safe just because the AV deleted the stealer executable; the data has already been stolen and requires immediate remediation.
- Avoid delaying the credential reset process; stolen credentials are often monetized or utilized within hours of the theft.
References & External Analysis
- Search "hpcubestlr" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "hpcubestlr" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "hpcubestlr" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Hpcubestlr and what threat category does it belong to?
Hpcubestlr is classified as a Trojan. Documented across security telemetry, it is engineered to execute unauthorized operations, establish persistent footholds on target endpoints, and facilitate malicious campaigns targeting enterprise and individual environments.
How does Hpcubestlr establish persistence and evade defensive controls?
Hpcubestlr typically establishes persistence through registry run keys, scheduled tasks, or service installations, while evading signature-based antivirus solutions through code obfuscation, memory injection, or anti-analysis sandbox checks.
What are the essential incident response steps for mitigating a Hpcubestlr compromise?
Security teams responding to Hpcubestlr should immediately isolate affected endpoints from the network, perform memory triage to capture volatile forensic artifacts, audit registry and startup persistence mechanisms, revoke exposed user credentials, and restore systems from verified, clean backups.
What secondary payloads and staging behaviors are commonly associated with Hpcubestlr?
Hpcubestlr frequently operates as a loader or dropper designed to establish a foothold before downloading and executing secondary high-impact malware payloads. Depending on the threat actor's objectives, these dropped modules can range from ransomware and banking injects to modular infostealers and remote management backdoors.
How can security operations teams effectively detect and hunt for Hpcubestlr across enterprise endpoints?
Defenders should hunt for Hpcubestlr by deploying behavioral endpoint detection and response (EDR) rules that monitor suspicious process spawning (such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawned from office documents or temporary directories), anomalous outbound network connections from non-browser binaries, and unauthorized modifications to Windows Run keys and scheduled task registries.
How do I remove the Hpcubestlr Trojan from Windows?
Manual removal of Hpcubestlr is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Hpcubestlr a virus or a Trojan?
Hpcubestlr is classified as a Trojan. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Hpcubestlr typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Hpcubestlr infection?
Symptoms of Hpcubestlr can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Trojans
Want to prevent Hpcubestlr and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Banking Trojan Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/hpcubestlr.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.