Huntpos

Overview

Malware:Win32/Huntpos is a highly destructive and specialized Point-of-Sale (PoS) malware family. It is engineered specifically to target retail, hospitality, and food service environments. Its primary objective is to scrape the volatile memory (RAM) of infected PoS terminals to extract unencrypted credit card Track 1 and Track 2 data before the transaction is encrypted and sent to the payment processor. This stolen data is then exfiltrated and sold on dark web carding forums (like Joker's Stash).

Understanding Huntpos (PoS RAM Scrapers)
To a retail employee using the register, the machine functions normally, allowing transactions to process. However, to a security operations center (SOC) or a forensic investigator, a Huntpos infection represents a catastrophic PCI-DSS breach, leading to massive financial liability, brand damage, and regulatory fines (`T1005`).

Execution and Memory Scraping Mechanics
Huntpos is typically deployed after attackers gain initial access to the corporate network (often via compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) - `T1133` - or phishing) and move laterally to the isolated PoS VLAN. Once executed on a terminal, Huntpos establishes persistence as a Windows Service (`T1543.003`). It operates by continuously iterating through the memory space of running processes (specifically targeting the payment application executable). It uses regular expressions (Regex) to identify data patterns matching the format of credit card magnetic stripe data (Track 1/Track 2) (`T1005`). Once identified, the data is dumped to a hidden, encrypted log file on disk (`T1074.001`) and periodically exfiltrated to an external C2 server via HTTP POST requests (`T1041`).

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is massive financial fraud resulting from compromised customer payment cards. Host-based IoCs include the presence of unexpected Windows Services on PoS terminals, anomalous DLLs injected into the payment application process, and the existence of encrypted, hidden log files (often disguised with generic names like `syslog.dat` or `winstat.tmp`) in system directories. Network IoCs include the PoS terminal making unexpected outbound HTTP connections to external, non-whitelisted IP addresses.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_HUNTPOS_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Huntpos"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "huntpos" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Huntpos (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: 9e5b3d30-9de6-5c04-b693-002e6790be4c
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Huntpos malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/huntpos
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1074_001
- attack.t1543_003
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1041
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_HUNTPOS_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Huntpos tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "huntpos" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately disconnect the infected PoS terminals from the network (unplug the Ethernet cable) to halt the exfiltration of stolen credit card data.
2. Do NOT reboot or power off the PoS terminal; volatile memory (RAM) contains critical forensic evidence, including the malware's active processes and potentially unencrypted card data.
3. Engage a specialized Incident Response (IR) firm and a PCI Forensic Investigator (PFI) immediately, as required by PCI-DSS regulations.
4. Perform a massive enterprise hunt across the entire PoS network VLAN for similar indicators of compromise; PoS malware is rarely deployed to a single machine.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not attempt to 'clean' the PoS terminal with standard antivirus; the machine is compromised and must be forensically imaged and then securely wiped.
2. Avoid communicating about the breach on the compromised corporate network; use out-of-band communication.

References & External Analysis

• Search "huntpos" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "huntpos" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "huntpos" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Advanced Threat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Easyspeedcheck
• Xmrigminer
• Fakerean
• Smartinstaller
• Gamsofts
• Speesipro
• Regcurepro
• Searchbar

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/huntpos.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.