Jeefo

Overview

Jeefo (also known as Hidrag, and cataloged in security vendor encyclopedias as Virus:Win32/Jeefo.A, PE_JEEFO.A, and Virus.Win32.Hidrag.a) is a classic parasitic Portable Executable (PE) file infector that first emerged in 2003. Known for its persistent infection routine, Jeefo targets 32-bit Windows executable files (.exe) that meet or exceed a specific size threshold of 102,400 bytes. When an infected program is launched, the viral code executes first, installs a background Windows service (frequently named 'PowerManager' and executing svchost.exe from the Windows directory), and systematically scans all local hard drives, mapped network shares, and removable storage media for executable files to infect. The virus appends approximately 36,352 bytes of polymorphic, encrypted viral code to the end of target files and redirects the PE entry point. When an infected host file is executed, Jeefo decrypts the original application in memory and launches it, allowing the legitimate program to appear functional while continuing viral propagation in the background.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Virus:Win32/Jeefo.A
• PE_JEEFO.A
• Virus.Win32.Hidrag.a
• W32/Jeefo
• Win32.Jeefo

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Parasitic Pe File Infectors

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Jeefo.A · Hidrag.A · Jeefo.Service

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5
• 0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b

Delivery vectors

• Peer-to-peer file sharing and infected USB flash drives carrying infected PE executables
• Shared network drives with open write access across local corporate subnets

Persistence mechanisms

• Windows Service: PowerManager (pointing to %WINDIR%\svchost.exe)
• HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PowerManager

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_JEEFO_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Jeefo"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "jeefo" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "virus:win32/jeefo.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "pe_jeefo.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "virus.win32.hidrag.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "w32/jeefo" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32.jeefo" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Jeefo (File Infector) Execution & Triage
id: 542c7529-dd2c-5108-b64d-5a36b3a590ca
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Jeefo malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/jeefo
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.file-infector
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055_002
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_JEEFO_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Jeefo tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "jeefo" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate the infected host from local network shares immediately to prevent widespread executable infection.
2. Stop and disable the malicious Windows background service (PowerManager).
3. Run a specialized antivirus disinfection utility capable of stripping the parasitic viral code from infected executables.
4. If system executables are corrupt, restore affected binaries from known-clean system backups or perform an OS reinstallation.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not execute unknown software binaries from infected storage media on clean workstations.
2. Avoid sharing executable files across unauthenticated network file shares.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Virus:Win32/Jeefo.A
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - PE_JEEFO.A
• Broadcom Symantec Security Response - W32.Jeefo
• Search "jeefo" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "jeefo" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "jeefo" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: File Infector)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Sivis
• Virut
• Invader
• Sality
• Coma
• Tenga
• Viking
• Dinwod

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/jeefo.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.