Papras

Category: infostealer · Aliases: Trojan:Win32/Papras, PWS:Win32/Papras, Trojan-PSW.Win32.Papras, Win32/Papras, Papras Stealer · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 15 · Enrichment: curated_sourced · Updated: 2026-10-15
Category: InfostealerStatus: Automated SignaturePlatform: WINDOWS_PEStage: Execution, PersistenceActor: Unknown / CybercriminalIndustry: Global / OpportunisticMotivation: Opportunistic🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server 2022
Executive Summary
Papras (classified across cybersecurity vendors as Trojan:Win32/Papras, PWS:Win32/Papras, and Trojan-PSW.Win32.Papras) is a modular password stealer and banking trojan family targeting Windows environments.

Table of Contents

Overview

Papras (classified across cybersecurity vendors as Trojan:Win32/Papras, PWS:Win32/Papras, and Trojan-PSW.Win32.Papras) is a modular password stealer and banking trojan family targeting Windows environments. Disseminated primarily via malicious spam attachments and exploit kits, Papras executes memory-resident credential scraping routines. It extracts stored user account credentials, autofill data, session cookies, and digital certificates from popular web browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer/Edge) and email clients (Outlook, Thunderbird), as well as FTP clients (FileZilla, Total Commander). Papras injects its payload into legitimate processes (such as svchost.exe or explorer.exe) to evade security hooks, encrypting exfiltrated logs via RC4 or AES before transmitting them over HTTP/HTTPS to remote command-and-control servers.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-PIADProcess Injection Analysis & DetectionDetectT1055Monitor cross-process thread creation (CreateRemoteThread) and asynchronous procedure calls (QueueUserAPC).
D3-NTINetwork Traffic InspectionDetectT1105Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols.
D3-MitBAMan-in-the-Browser AnalysisDetectT1185Deploy browser extension whitelisting and hardware-backed session binding to prevent rogue DOM and socket injection.
D3-TRTraffic Rate LimitingIsolateT1498Deploy BGP Flowspec and edge scrubbing proxies to automatically throttle volumetric SYN and UDP reflection attacks.

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_PAPRAS_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Papras"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "papras" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/papras" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "pws:win32/papras" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan-psw.win32.papras" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/papras" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "papras stealer" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Papras (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: ce2c186b-c214-5154-854f-c8693377202c
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Papras malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting,
  master key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/papras
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1555_004
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1041
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_PAPRAS_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Papras tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "papras" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

Containment & Response Steps

Home Users: If you suspect a malware infection on your personal device, disconnect from the internet immediately and run a full system scan with your antivirus software (see our TotalAV Antivirus & Security Support Guide). The steps below are intended for IT professionals responding to enterprise incidents.

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

  1. Instantly isolate the endpoint; the attacker possesses real-time capability to intercept web traffic and manipulate banking sessions.
  2. Initiate an immediate password reset for all financial, corporate, and personal accounts accessed from the infected machine, utilizing a clean device.
  3. Capture a forensic memory image (RAM dump) to extract the decrypted C2 addresses and the specific web inject configuration files (target lists).
  4. Perform a clean OS rebuild, as banking trojans often establish deep, redundant persistence mechanisms that are difficult to fully eradicate.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

  1. Do not allow the user to continue accessing financial portals while 'monitoring' the threat; the MitB capability intercepts traffic before encryption.
  2. Avoid ignoring sudden spikes in outbound network traffic, as the infected machine may be actively participating in a DDoS extortion campaign.

References & External Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Trojan:Win32/Papras?

Papras is a modular credential stealer and trojan that harvests passwords from browsers, email clients, and FTP applications.

How does Papras evade endpoint detection?

It injects its malicious threads into trusted system processes like svchost.exe and encrypts exfiltrated traffic.

What applications are targeted by Papras for credential harvesting?

Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, Outlook, Thunderbird, FileZilla, and Windows Vault.

How does Papras exfiltrate stolen credentials?

It packages credentials into encrypted payloads and transmits them via HTTP/HTTPS POST requests to remote C2 infrastructure.

What should victims do if infected by Papras?

Isolate the endpoint, terminate unauthorized process injections, purge malware files, and immediately rotate all passwords.

How do I remove the Papras Infostealer from Windows?

Manual removal of Papras is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

Is Papras a virus or a Infostealer?

Papras is classified as a Infostealer. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Papras typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.

What are the main symptoms of a Papras infection?

Symptoms of Papras can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against Infostealers

Want to prevent Papras and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: InfoStealer Protection & Remediation.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/papras.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.