Paradise

Overview

Ransom:Win32/Paradise is a prolific crypto-ransomware family operating under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It allows affiliates to distribute the malware while the core developers maintain the payment portals and decryption infrastructure. It is characterized by appending the `.paradise` (or similar variations) extension to encrypted files and dropping an HTML ransom note.

Understanding Paradise (Ransomware-as-a-Service)
To an end-user, Paradise represents a catastrophic loss of access to all personal and business files. For an enterprise, an infection often indicates a broader failure in email filtering (as it is heavily distributed via malspam) or a failure to secure remote access points. Because it operates as a RaaS, the initial access techniques can vary wildly depending on which affiliate is conducting the attack.

Execution and Extortion Mechanics
Paradise is frequently delivered via spear-phishing campaigns containing malicious IQY (Internet Query) files, macros, or `.js` scripts that download the payload (`T1566.001`). Upon execution, Paradise often attempts to disable antivirus software and services related to SQL databases or Exchange servers to ensure those files are unlocked for encryption (`T1489`). It achieves persistence via Registry Run keys (`T1547.001`). Before encrypting, it executes commands to delete Volume Shadow Copies (`vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet`) (`T1490`). It uses strong encryption (often RSA-1024 or Salsa20) (`T1486`), iterating through local drives and network shares, explicitly targeting high-value data files while avoiding critical Windows system files to keep the OS bootable so the victim can view the ransom note.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is severe data encryption and operational downtime. Host-based IoCs include files renamed with the `__{ID}_{Email}.paradise` format, EDR alerts for `vssadmin.exe` execution, and the sudden termination of database processes. The presence of the ransom note (often `Instructions with your files.txt` or `.html`) on the desktop is a definitive indicator.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_PARADISE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Paradise"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "paradise" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Paradise (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: 0fd8439d-7422-52e0-8f56-ac481fa1cadf
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Paradise malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/paradise
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1489
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1566_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_PARADISE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Paradise tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "paradise" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately sever the network connection of the infected endpoint to prevent the ransomware from traversing SMB shares and encrypting network drives.
2. Identify the initial delivery vector (e.g., a specific phishing email) and purge similar emails from all corporate inboxes.
3. Do NOT reboot the infected machine if possible; capture a live memory image (RAM dump). Some older variants of Paradise had cryptographic flaws where keys could be recovered.
4. Initiate recovery procedures from isolated, offline backups.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not pay the ransom without exhausting all other options; funding RaaS operations encourages further attacks, and affiliates often fail to provide working decryptors.
2. Avoid reconnecting restored servers to the network until the initial vulnerability (e.g., lack of MFA on RDP or poor email filtering) is resolved.

References & External Analysis

• Search "paradise" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "paradise" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "paradise" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Cwqw
• Xizfawwyz0Ab
• Bybz
• Udslee
• Cmhfbw9R
• Cakl
• Poxters
• Cerber

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/paradise.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.