Prochack

Category: advanced_threat · Aliases: None known · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 8 · Enrichment: expert-seo · Updated: 2026-06-09
Category: Advanced_ThreatStatus: Automated SignaturePlatform: WINDOWS_PEStage: Execution, PersistenceActor: Unknown / CybercriminalIndustry: Global / OpportunisticMotivation: Opportunistic🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows Server 2022
Executive Summary
HackTool:Win32/Prochack (or generic **Process Hacker** heuristics) refers to detections associated with powerful system administration and memory manipulation tools (most notably the open-source utility 'Process Hacker', now known as 'System Informer').

Table of Contents

Overview

HackTool:Win32/Prochack (or generic **Process Hacker** heuristics) refers to detections associated with powerful system administration and memory manipulation tools (most notably the open-source utility 'Process Hacker', now known as 'System Informer'). While these are legitimate, highly useful tools for IT professionals to monitor and debug Windows systems, they are frequently flagged by security vendors because threat actors heavily abuse them to forcefully terminate EDR solutions, dump credentials, and manipulate system memory during an attack.

Understanding Prochack Abuse
To an end-user, this tool is invisible unless they explicitly launched it. For a security analyst, the unapproved presence of a tool like Process Hacker on a corporate endpoint is a massive red flag. Because the tool installs a legitimate kernel-level driver (`KProcessHacker.sys`), it operates with higher privileges than the operating system itself, allowing an attacker to bypass standard Windows security boundaries and manipulate critical processes that are normally protected.

Execution and Legitimate Tool Abuse
Threat actors drop Prochack/Process Hacker during the post-exploitation phase (`T1105`). Because the executable and its associated kernel driver are digitally signed (often by a legitimate open-source certificate), it easily bypasses initial static analysis (`T1553.002`). The attacker uses the tool's GUI or command-line interface to perform highly destructive actions (`T1204.002`). The most common abuse is the forceful termination of Antivirus and EDR sensors (`T1562.001`), utilizing the kernel driver to bypass tamper protection. Attackers also use the tool to dump the memory of the `lsass.exe` process (`T1003.001`) to extract plaintext passwords and NTLM hashes, mimicking the behavior of Mimikatz without needing to drop the actual Mimikatz binary.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is the complete subversion of endpoint security controls and the theft of privileged credentials. The primary IoC is the execution of known Process Hacker binaries (`ProcessHacker.exe`, `SystemInformer.exe`) from unusual directories (like `%Temp%`), or the installation of the `KProcessHacker.sys` kernel driver. EDR logs will flag anomalous attempts to read the memory of `lsass.exe` or forceful attempts to suspend/kill security-related services.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-LSALSA Protection & Credential GuardHardenT1003.001Enable Windows LSA RunAsPPL (Protected Process Light) and Credential Guard to prevent memory dumping of lsass.exe.
D3-KPAKernel Patching & Privilege AuditingHardenT1068Enforce rapid OS kernel patch cycles and deploy Exploit Guard protections to block memory corruption and elevation exploits.
D3-STASecurity Tool Anti-Tamper EnforcementHardenT1562.001Block unauthorized modification of antivirus registry flags and prevent stopping security agent services.

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_PROCHACK_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Prochack"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "prochack" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Prochack (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: 2eff4372-dc31-5eee-89f8-fa7cedc20b35
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Prochack malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/prochack
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1003_001
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1553_002
- attack.t1562_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_PROCHACK_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Prochack tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "prochack" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

Containment & Response Steps

Home Users: If you suspect a malware infection on your personal device, disconnect from the internet immediately and run a full system scan with your antivirus software (see our TotalAV Antivirus & Security Support Guide). The steps below are intended for IT professionals responding to enterprise incidents.

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

  1. Instantly isolate the endpoint; the presence of Process Hacker indicates an attacker has already achieved interactive, administrative access to the machine.
  2. Assume the local EDR agent has been compromised or blinded by the tool's kernel driver.
  3. Enforce a mandatory password reset for all accounts that have logged into the machine, as the attacker likely used the tool to dump LSASS memory.
  4. Perform a deep forensic review to identify the initial entry vector that allowed the attacker to drop and execute the tool.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

  1. Do not dismiss the alert as a 'false positive' simply because Process Hacker is a known, legitimate tool; if IT did not explicitly authorize its use, it is a severe breach.
  2. Avoid relying solely on the local EDR for containment; isolate the machine at the network level.

References & External Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Prochack and what threat category does it belong to?

Prochack is classified as a Advanced Threat. Documented across security telemetry, it is engineered to execute unauthorized operations, establish persistent footholds on target endpoints, and facilitate malicious campaigns targeting enterprise and individual environments.

How does Prochack establish persistence and evade defensive controls?

Prochack typically establishes persistence through registry run keys, scheduled tasks, or service installations, while evading signature-based antivirus solutions through code obfuscation, memory injection, or anti-analysis sandbox checks.

What are the essential incident response steps for mitigating a Prochack compromise?

Security teams responding to Prochack should immediately isolate affected endpoints from the network, perform memory triage to capture volatile forensic artifacts, audit registry and startup persistence mechanisms, revoke exposed user credentials, and restore systems from verified, clean backups.

What lateral movement and credential access tactics does Prochack leverage in enterprise intrusions?

Prochack frequently utilizes privileged account harvesting techniques such as LSASS memory dumping, Kerberoasting, and token impersonation to escalate privileges. Once administrative credentials are acquired, it pivots across the victim network utilizing living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as WMI, PowerShell remoting, and PsExec, or abuses remote desktop protocols (RDP) to reach critical internal repositories and domain controllers.

How does Prochack maintain covert communications and evade perimeter network monitoring?

Prochack often relies on multi-stage command and control (C2) architectures utilizing encrypted protocols over standard web ports (HTTPS/443 or DNS tunneling) to blend in with legitimate enterprise network traffic. Many variants incorporate proxy networks, domain fronting, or cloud services (such as Microsoft Graph API, Google Drive, or Telegram) to masquerade C2 channels, bypassing traditional signature-based egress filtering.

How do I remove the Prochack Advanced_Threat from Windows?

Manual removal of Prochack is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

Is Prochack a virus or a Advanced_Threat?

Prochack is classified as a Advanced_Threat. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Prochack typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.

What are the main symptoms of a Prochack infection?

Symptoms of Prochack can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against Advanced_Threats

Want to prevent Prochack and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Think You've Been Hacked? What To Do First.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/prochack.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.