Pswdump

Overview

Executive Summary

Technical Architecture and Exploitation

• Registry SAM Extraction: The tool accesses the `HKLM\SAM` and `HKLM\SYSTEM` registry hives to extract the SYSKEY (the boot key) and subsequently decrypt the NTLM hashes of all local user accounts stored in the SAM database.
• Memory Scraping (LSASS): Advanced variants can directly hook into `lsass.exe` to scrape plaintext passwords (if WDigest is enabled) or NTLM hashes of active logon sessions from volatile memory.
• Hash Cracking Preparation: The extracted hashes are formatted (typically in the `user:RID:LM:NTLM` format) and outputted to a text file, allowing the attacker to load them into offline cracking tools (like Hashcat or John the Ripper) or use them directly in Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks.

Threat Impact

Defense and Resilience Strategies

• Credential Guard: Enable Microsoft Defender Credential Guard on all modern Windows operating systems. Credential Guard utilizes virtualization-based security (VBS) to isolate LSASS and secrets, rendering tools like PSWDump highly ineffective.
• Disable LM and WDigest: Ensure legacy authentication protocols are disabled via Group Policy. Restrict NTLM usage where possible and force Kerberos authentication.
• Behavioral EDR: Deploy EDR solutions specifically tuned to alert on processes attempting to access `lsass.exe` (Event ID 4656/4663) or unauthorized attempts to read the SAM registry hive.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• HackTool.PSWDump
• Tool.Pwdump
• Riskware.CredentialDumper

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1003.001: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.
• T1003.002: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.
• T1059.001: Restrict execution of PowerShell. Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and Script Block Logging.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_PSWDUMP_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Pswdump"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "pswdump" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hacktool.pswdump" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "tool.pwdump" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "riskware.credentialdumper" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Pswdump (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: d3f7279d-7efb-54a8-ada8-c240ff059ee5
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Pswdump malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/pswdump
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1003_001
- attack.t1003_002
- attack.t1059_001
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_PSWDUMP_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Pswdump tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "pswdump" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Enforce forensic network isolation on all suspected endpoints while maintaining an out-of-band telemetry conduit to capture live Pswdump adversary activity.
2. Perform full memory dumps across identified staging nodes to extract memory-only implants, kernel rootkit hooks, and decrypted Pswdump C2 infrastructure IP/domain lists.
3. Review Active Directory domain controller authentication logs for anomalous Kerberos ticket requests (Pass-the-Ticket, Golden Ticket) and unauthorized DCSync operations associated with Pswdump.
4. Block all confirmed C2 domains, dynamic DNS endpoints, and proxy IP addresses across perimeter firewalls, proxies, and DNS security gateways.
5. Conduct an enterprise-wide sweep across surrounding subnets for secondary webshells, WMI event subscriptions, or remote execution tooling left behind by Pswdump operators.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Pswdump dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Pswdump until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "pswdump" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "pswdump" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "pswdump" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Advanced Threat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Revizer
• Spyrix
• Wmfap
• Navipromo
• Instmonster
• Keyer
• Yahlover
• Gaofenquming

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/pswdump.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.