Satwancrypt

Overview

Ransom:Win32/Satwancrypt is a destructive ransomware strain designed to infiltrate corporate networks, encrypt critical business data, and extort organizations for financial gain. Like most modern ransomware families, Satwancrypt focuses on rapid encryption and ensuring backups are destroyed before the victim is presented with the ransom demand.

Understanding the Satwancrypt Threat
To an infected user, the outcome is catastrophic: documents, databases, and critical files are suddenly inaccessible, their filenames often altered to include a specific extension (e.g., `.satwan`). A ransom note (usually a `.txt` or `.hta` file) is dropped in every encrypted directory, demanding payment in cryptocurrency (Bitcoin or Monero) in exchange for the decryption key. For a security operations center (SOC), a Satwancrypt detonation represents the final, most visible stage of a potentially prolonged network compromise.

Execution and Encryption Mechanics
Satwancrypt is typically deployed manually by attackers after they have gained deep access to the network via Initial Access Brokers (IABs) utilizing compromised RDP credentials (`T1133`) or unpatched VPN vulnerabilities (`T1190`). Once deployed via Group Policy or PsExec (`T1569.002`), the ransomware first attempts to neutralize endpoint defenses (`T1562.001`). Crucially, it executes a series of commands (often `vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet`) to destroy Windows Volume Shadow Copies (`T1490`), preventing the victim from easily restoring files locally. It then rapidly encrypts targeted files (`T1486`) using strong cryptographic algorithms (typically AES paired with RSA), ensuring the files cannot be decrypted without the attacker's private key.

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is severe operational downtime and potential permanent data loss. The primary IoC is the massive, rapid modification of files across the hard drive and network shares, and the appearance of the ransom note. Host-based IoCs include EDR alerts for the mass deletion of shadow copies and the sudden termination of database and backup services (like SQL or Exchange) to unlock files for encryption.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_SATWANCRYPT_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Satwancrypt"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "satwancrypt" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Satwancrypt (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: ac3578e9-a17c-5ccc-8643-29e4eaadbac5
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Satwancrypt malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/satwancrypt
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1569_002
- attack.t1490
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_SATWANCRYPT_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Satwancrypt tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "satwancrypt" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Instantly isolate the infected endpoint from the network to halt the encryption process, explicitly disconnecting it from mapped network shares and cloud syncing services.
2. Do NOT reboot the machine immediately; capture a live memory dump (RAM) first, as poorly coded ransomware sometimes leaves the encryption keys in memory.
3. Identify the specific variant and check 'NoMoreRansom.org' to see if a free decryption tool has been developed by security researchers.
4. If no decryptor is available, wipe the infected systems and restore data from secure, immutable offline backups.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not pay the ransom. Paying funds criminal enterprises, and there is no guarantee the attackers will provide a working decryption tool.
2. Avoid reconnecting the machine to the network until a full forensic investigation has determined the initial entry vector (e.g., how did the attackers get in to deploy the ransomware?).

References & External Analysis

• Search "satwancrypt" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "satwancrypt" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "satwancrypt" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Cmhfbw9R
• Jyfi
• Vz2Au4Dpceii
• Searchprovide
• Rarmal
• Kirts
• Kryptpck
• Meinv

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/satwancrypt.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.