Trick

Overview

Trojan:Win32/Trick (universally known as **Trickbot**) is one of the most successful, devastating, and modular malware families in history. Originally emerging in 2016 as a banking trojan designed to steal financial credentials via web injects, Trickbot evolved into a massive, modular botnet. Crucially, the operators of Trickbot transitioned to an 'Initial Access Broker' (IAB) model, using their massive network of infected enterprise machines to deploy devastating ransomware (specifically **Ryuk** and **Conti**) on behalf of top-tier cybercriminal syndicates.

Understanding Trickbot
To an end-user, the infection is invisible until the ransomware payload drops. For security analysts, a Trickbot detection is a 'code red' emergency. It means the organization's perimeter has been breached, lateral movement is likely already occurring, and a massive, enterprise-wide ransomware encryption event is imminent, often within 24-48 hours.

Execution, Modularity, and Ransomware Mechanics
Trickbot was distributed massively via Emotet malspam campaigns (`T1566.001`). Upon execution (`T1204.002`), Trickbot establishes persistence via Scheduled Tasks (`T1053.005`) and disables Windows Defender (`T1562.001`). Its true power lies in its modularity (`T1105`); it pulls down specific plugins (DLLs) from the C2 server based on the target. It uses modules like `pwgrab` to steal browser credentials, `networkDll` to map the corporate network (`T1046`), and `mshare` to aggressively move laterally via SMB exploits like EternalBlue (`T1210`). Finally, once domain admin privileges are secured, the operators push the final payload: a Cobalt Strike beacon, followed rapidly by Ryuk or Conti ransomware deployment across the entire domain (`T1486`).

Indicators of Compromise & Impact
The impact is total enterprise destruction via ransomware. The primary EDR IoCs include `svchost.exe` making anomalous outbound connections to known Trickbot C2s, the creation of specific Scheduled Tasks (often mimicking legitimate Windows tasks), and massive, rapid lateral SMB scanning originating from a single endpoint.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_TRICK_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Trick"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "trick" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Trick (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: 7f36be2c-4694-598f-aa3d-1fedbe0c99de
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Trick malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/trick
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1210
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_TRICK_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Trick tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "trick" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Initiate maximum incident response immediately. Isolate the infected endpoint, but assume the entire domain is compromised and lateral movement has occurred.
2. Disconnect the entire corporate network from the internet to sever the C2 connection and prevent the final ransomware payload from being downloaded.
3. Enforce a mandatory, immediate password reset for all Domain Administrators, as Trickbot specifically targets high-privilege accounts.
4. Perform a deep forensic hunt across the entire domain for Cobalt Strike beacons and Trickbot lateral movement artifacts.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do NOT treat a Trickbot alert as a routine commodity malware infection; it is almost always the precursor to a targeted ransomware attack.
2. Avoid relying solely on deleting the initial dropper; the modular plugins are injected into memory across multiple machines.

References & External Analysis

• Search "trick" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "trick" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "trick" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Spynomore
• Dupate
• Boopcel
• Rising
• Feedarch
• Stampado
• Ryuk
• Desurou

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/trick.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.