Csdimonetize

Overview

Csdimonetize (cataloged across security vendors as Adware:Win32/Csdimonetize, Adware.Csdimonetize, and PUA:Win32/Csdimonetize) is an aggressive software bundler and adware monetization framework active since 2015. Deployed through Pay-Per-Install (PPI) affiliate monetization networks, Csdimonetize packages legitimate freeware applications inside an invasive installation wrapper. During installation, the wrapper employs deceptive UI dark patterns—such as obfuscated opt-out checkboxes and misleading accept buttons—to install secondary Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs), browser extensions, and toolbars without informed user consent. Once active, Csdimonetize registers persistent autostart entries in the Windows Registry (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) and deploys background watchdog services to prevent uninstallation. The adware forcefully alters default browser search engines and homepages across Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Microsoft Edge, injects intrusive pop-up advertisements and banner links into visited web pages, and exfiltrates search query telemetry to commercial marketing servers.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Adware:Win32/Csdimonetize
• Adware.Csdimonetize
• PUA:Win32/Csdimonetize
• Trojan:Win32/CsdiMonetize
• Win32/Csdimonetize

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Pay-Per-Install Software Bundler · Browser Search Hijacker Engine

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Csdimonetize.A · Csdimonetize.Gen · Csdimonetize.Msr

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• f5a7c9e1b3d5f7a9c1e3b5d7f9a1c3e5b7d9f1a3c5e7b9d1f3a5c7e9b1d3f5a7
• a6b8c0d2e4f6a8b0c2d4e6f8a0b2c4d6e8f0a2b4c6d8e0f2a4c6e8b0d2f4a6c8

Delivery vectors

• Bundled installer wrappers for free software utilities and media players
• Deceptive software download portals

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Csdimonetize
• %LOCALAPPDATA%\Csdimonetize\csdimonetize.exe

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_CSDIMONETIZE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Csdimonetize"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "csdimonetize" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "adware:win32/csdimonetize" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "adware.csdimonetize" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pua:win32/csdimonetize" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan:win32/csdimonetize" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/csdimonetize" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Csdimonetize (Adware) Execution & Triage
id: d670dfbb-ce6a-52ab-bcbc-39583ef4cf85
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Csdimonetize malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary
  user directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/csdimonetize
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.adware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1204_002
- attack.t1176
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_CSDIMONETIZE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Csdimonetize tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "csdimonetize" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disconnect the affected host from the network to halt advertising telemetry and secondary software downloads.
2. Uninstall recently installed freeware applications and companion toolbars via Windows Settings > Installed Apps.
3. Inspect installed browser extensions in Chrome, Edge, and Firefox, removing any unfamiliar add-ons and resetting search defaults.
4. Execute an on-demand antimalware scan using Microsoft Defender or Malwarebytes to purge residual registry keys and files.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not rush through software installation wizards; inspect custom settings to uncheck bundled third-party programs.
2. Avoid downloading utilities from portals that enforce custom download wrappers.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Adware:Win32/Csdimonetize
• Malwarebytes Labs Threat Intelligence - Adware.Csdimonetize
• Search "csdimonetize" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "csdimonetize" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "csdimonetize" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Adware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Inbox
• Swizzor
• Rungbu
• Jawego
• Advancedpccare
• Browsefox
• 1Clickdownload
• Ulpm

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/csdimonetize.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.