Ghost

Overview

Gh0st RAT (also tracked in security taxonomies as GhostRAT or Backdoor.Gh0st) is a seminal open-source Remote Access Trojan originally authored in 2008 by the Chinese Red Hacker Alliance (Honker Union of China). Developed in C++ with Microsoft Foundation Classes (MFC), Gh0st RAT was engineered to provide real-time remote surveillance over high-latency networks, featuring real-time screen transmission, audio eavesdropping, remote shell execution, webcam capture, and full file system management. Gh0st RAT entered the global spotlight in March 2009 during the landmark 'GhostNet' investigation conducted by the Munk School of Global Affairs at Citizen Lab. The research uncovered an expansive cyber espionage apparatus that systematically infected at least 1,295 computers across 103 countries—infiltrating the private offices of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government-in-exile, foreign ministries, and international embassies. Because its source code was publicly released, countless state-sponsored APT groups (including APT27, APT30, and TA428) customized its network header (substituting the default 'Gh0st' 5-byte magic header with 'KrisR', 'Oxeed', 'HTTPS', or 'B0SS') and deployed it across hundreds of espionage campaigns for over a decade.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Gh0st RAT
• Gh0st
• GhostRAT
• Backdoor.Gh0st
• Win32/Ghost
• Trojan.GhostRAT

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Red Hacker Alliance (Honker Union) / Chinese APT Groups (GhostNet Investigation) High confidence
  Basis: Authored by Red Hacker Alliance in 2008. Groundbreaking Citizen Lab GhostNet investigation in 2009 documented widespread state-sponsored surveillance across diplomatic and government targets in 103 countries. [source]

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Gh0St Rat V3.6 (Open Source) · Gh0St Rat Beta 3.7 · Custom Magic-Header Variants (Krisr, Oxeed, Https, B0Ss)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.
• T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2006-0003 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2008-2244 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 2efb6d17b5e4c6981cfda552553ca4be969796ff07a835a96aef71a2ec703ce5
• b1b4c330f89fa6d165f973e20e8b22a08846c4f09a5b3a8634860b0ec89c565d

Delivery vectors

• Targeted spear-phishing with malicious attachments exploiting Microsoft Word and Office vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-0158)
• Self-extracting archives (SFX) disguised as news releases, embassy reports, or human rights manifestos

Persistence mechanisms

• Service registration disguised as legitimate Windows services (e.g., 'RapiClient' or 'WinHost')
• Run registry key creation under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_GHOST_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Ghost"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "ghost" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "gh0st rat" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "gh0st" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "ghostrat" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "backdoor.gh0st" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/ghost" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "trojan.ghostrat" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Ghost (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: fe8b72b6-06cd-5cad-ae77-55c7ac3503b1
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Ghost malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
  Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/ghost
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1125
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \reg.exe
    - \schtasks.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \CurrentVersion\Run
    - /create /tn
    - bypass -enc
    - net user /add
    - net localgroup administrators
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_GHOST_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Ghost tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "ghost" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate the compromised host from internal LAN and WAN environments to cut off interactive remote shell sessions established by Ghost.
2. Inspect active socket listeners and outbound established network connections ('netstat -ano') to identify and sever covert TCP/UDP channels used by Ghost.
3. Scan Windows Services, Scheduled Tasks, and Startup folders to locate and eliminate persistent backdoor listeners configured by Ghost.
4. Invalidate all active VPN profiles, local administrator credentials, and session tokens that may have been harvested by the Ghost operator.
5. Re-image the affected host using a validated golden image prior to reconnecting it to enterprise network segments.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not attempt to interact with or send messages through the Ghost remote terminal, as this alerts the attacker and may cause them to execute destructive anti-forensic commands.
2. Avoid relying solely on static file signatures, as Ghost payloads frequently execute reflectively in memory without writing binaries to disk.

References & External Analysis

• Citizen Lab - Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network
• MITRE ATT&CK - Gh0st RAT (S0032)
• CISA Advisory - Remnant Threats of Legacy Open-Source Backdoors
• Search "ghost" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "ghost" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "ghost" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Rat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Prorat
• Turkojan
• Quasar
• Lost_Door
• Spygate
• Mokes
• Houndhack
• Wabot

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/ghost.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.