Sinique

Overview

Sinique (historically documented across threat intelligence archives as Sinique Trojan, Sinique 1.0, and Backdoor.Sinique) is an early 2000s remote access trojan (RAT) developed in Delphi. Designed as a modular client-server administration framework, Sinique allows remote unauthorized operators to control compromised Windows systems across TCP network sockets. Upon execution, the Sinique server binary installs itself into the Windows system directory, configures autostart persistence via the Windows registry Run keys, and listens for inbound connections or handshakes authenticated with a hardcoded pre-shared password. The trojan features comprehensive administrative commands including remote file system browsing, file upload and download, process termination, remote command shell execution, registry editing, and system reboot or power termination capabilities.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Sinique Trojan
• Backdoor.Sinique
• Trojan.Win32.Sinique
• Sinique 1.0
• Backdoor:Win32/Sinique

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Classic Delphi Backdoor Era

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Sinique 1.0 · Sinique 1.2 · Sinique.Gen

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b
• 9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f

Delivery vectors

• Deceptive executable distribution via vintage IRC DCC file transfers and P2P networks
• Email attachments disguised as utility software or media archives

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SiniqueBackdoor
• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SiniqueSys

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_SINIQUE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Sinique"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "sinique" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "sinique trojan" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "backdoor.sinique" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.win32.sinique" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "sinique 1.0" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "backdoor:win32/sinique" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Sinique (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: 06709108-af7f-5775-87df-6986b4050834
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Sinique malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/sinique
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_SINIQUE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Sinique tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "sinique" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disconnect the compromised endpoint from the network to sever unauthorized remote access sessions.
2. Kill the active Sinique server process using Task Manager or command line utilities.
3. Remove the unauthorized registry run key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
4. Delete the Sinique server binary from the Windows System32 directory.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not execute software attachments received from unknown sources or P2P file shares.
2. Avoid exposing Windows workstations directly to the public internet without firewall boundary protections.

References & External Analysis

• Broadcom Symantec Security Response - Backdoor.Sinique
• Malware Museum Historical Backdoor Archive - Sinique
• Search "sinique" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "sinique" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "sinique" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Kates
• Travnet
• Mz0A4Gxuisb
• Ainslot
• Sohanad
• Dostre
• Jacksbot
• Bayrob

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/sinique.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.