Godzilla
Table of Contents
Overview
Godzilla (cataloged across cybersecurity advisories under signatures including Backdoor:Java/Godzilla, Backdoor:ASP/Godzilla, Backdoor:PHP/Godzilla, and Trojan:Win32/Godzilla) is a landmark dynamic cross-platform webshell and post-exploitation implant framework created by Chinese security researchers and extensively adopted by APT espionage actors and cybercrime syndicates since 2020. Designed to provide covert, persistent server access, Godzilla encrypts and decrypts all network command traffic dynamically using AES and custom obfuscation algorithms based on pre-shared secret keys. The Godzilla manager client supports dynamic memory injection, JVM/CLR class loading without touching disk, interactive shell access, file management, database manipulation, internal network proxy pivoting, and bypass of modern Web Application Firewalls (WAF) and EDR memory inspection.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Behinder Webshell Architecture
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Godzilla Java Jsp Shell · Godzilla Aspx Shell · Godzilla Php Shell
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1505.003 · T1059.004 · T1055 · T1090 · T1027
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1059.004: Restrict execution of scripting languages such as PowerShell, VBScript, or Python to authorized administrators. Enforce Script Block Logging.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-BDA | Binary De-obfuscation & Unpacking | Analyze | T1027 | Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation. |
D3-PIAD | Process Injection Analysis & Detection | Detect | T1055 | Monitor cross-process thread creation (CreateRemoteThread) and asynchronous procedure calls (QueueUserAPC). |
D3-SEA | Script Execution Analysis | Detect | T1059.004 | Analyze script block syntax and command arguments at runtime to detect malicious automation. |
D3-OAA | Outbound Network Traffic Filtering | Isolate | T1090 | Restrict outbound connections to known external proxy relays and enforce enterprise forward proxy authentication. |
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_GODZILLA_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Godzilla"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "godzilla" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "backdoor:java/godzilla" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "backdoor:asp/godzilla" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "backdoor:php/godzilla" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "godzilla webshell" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "trojan:win32/godzilla" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Godzilla (Webshell) Execution & Triage
id: 5300c4a8-0470-5f87-80d5-1511f26101e1
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Godzilla malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/godzilla
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.webshell
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1505_003
- attack.t1059_004
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \wscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- AppData\Local\Temp
- -WindowStyle Hidden
- /e:jscript
- bitsadmin /transfer
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: mediumTier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_GODZILLA_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Godzilla tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "godzilla" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}References & External Analysis
- Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Backdoor:Java/Godzilla
- CISA Advisory - Top Webshell Threats and Detection Guidance
- Search "godzilla" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "godzilla" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "godzilla" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Godzilla webshell framework?
Godzilla is an advanced cross-platform webshell framework that uses dynamic AES-encrypted payloads to manage compromised servers.
How does Godzilla evade Web Application Firewalls (WAF)?
It encrypts all HTTP request and response parameters using dynamic AES keys and custom encodings, concealing commands from WAF pattern matching.
What server platforms are supported by Godzilla?
Godzilla supports Java (JSP/Servlet), Microsoft .NET (ASPX), and PHP server application runtime environments.
What post-exploitation capabilities does Godzilla offer?
It provides file uploading/downloading, database management, memory-only Java class execution, internal network port forwarding, and interactive cmd shells.
How can defenders detect and remove Godzilla webshells?
Deploy File Integrity Monitoring (FIM) on web server document roots, inspect JVM runtime for unregistered memory servlets, and audit web server logs.
How do I remove the Godzilla Webshell from Windows?
Manual removal of Godzilla is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Godzilla a virus or a Webshell?
Godzilla is classified as a Webshell. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Godzilla typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Godzilla infection?
Symptoms of Godzilla can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Webshells
Want to prevent Godzilla and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Think You've Been Hacked? What To Do First.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/godzilla.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.