Hav_Rat
Table of Contents
Overview
Hav-RAT (cataloged across antivirus software as Backdoor:Win32/HavRAT, Trojan.Win32.HavRAT, and Backdoor.HavRat) is a classic Delphi-authored Remote Access Trojan (RAT) first observed in the early-to-mid 2000s cybercrime ecosystem. Designed to furnish remote malicious operators with complete interactive administrative dominion over compromised Windows endpoints, Hav-RAT listens on custom TCP ports or initiates reverse connections to dynamic DNS C2 servers. The trojan incorporates extensive surveillance and control modules, including real-time desktop screen capture, keystroke logging, active process enumeration and termination, remote file upload and download, remote registry editing, and interactive command shell spawning.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Delphi Rat Frameworks
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Hav-Rat 1.0 · Hav-Rat Pro · Win32/Havrat.B
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1056.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | Credential Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1113 | Screen Capture | Collection | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1059.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | Execution | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Command and Control | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
- T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
- T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.
- T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-MFA | Multi-factor Authentication | Harden | T1056.001 | Enforce FIDO2 / WebAuthn physical tokens to render keystroke-intercepted passwords useless. |
D3-PBA | Process Spawn Analysis | Detect | T1059.003 | Inspect command-line arguments and anomalous parent-child relationships spawning from cmd.exe. |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-NTI | Network Traffic Inspection | Detect | T1105 | Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols. |
D3-SD | Screen Capture Detection | Detect | T1113 | Monitor desktop graphics API calls (BitBlt, GetDC) triggered by non-standard background threads. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d
Delivery vectors
Peer-to-peer file sharing networks disguised as software cracks and game cheat toolsPhishing emails with malicious Microsoft Office attachments exploiting CVE-2012-0158
Persistence mechanisms
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\HavRatServerAuto-start Windows service registered under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\HavRatSvc
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_HAV_RAT_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Hav_Rat"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "hav_rat" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "backdoor:win32/havrat" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan.win32.havrat" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "backdoor.havrat" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "win32/havrat.rat" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "trojan.havrat" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Hav_rat (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 1d30f3a3-a99a-5e33-9be4-c13150d917f7
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Hav_rat malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via Windows
Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/hav_rat
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \reg.exe
- \schtasks.exe
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- \CurrentVersion\Run
- /create /tn
- bypass -enc
- net user /add
- net localgroup administrators
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_HAV_RAT_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Hav_Rat tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "hav_rat" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Isolate compromised endpoints to prevent ongoing interactive remote desktop streaming and lateral traversal.
- Terminate active Hav-RAT server processes and spawned cmd.exe command shells.
- Purge autostart registry entries under HKLM and HKCU Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
- Reset user credentials and conduct full endpoint forensic memory triage to identify secondary dropped implants.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not allow uninspected inbound connections on non-standard TCP listening ports across corporate perimeter firewalls.
- Avoid downloading or running pirated software from unverified peer-to-peer file sharing repositories.
References & External Analysis
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Hav-RAT and what are its origins?
Hav-RAT is a classic Delphi Remote Access Trojan developed in the mid-2000s to grant attackers unauthorized administrative remote control.
What interactive capabilities does Hav-RAT provide to attackers?
Hav-RAT provides screen capture, keystroke logging, file system manipulation, process management, and interactive command shells.
How did threat actors distribute Hav-RAT?
It was distributed through peer-to-peer file sharing networks, IRC chat DCC file transfers, and trojanized software utilities.
Which CVE vulnerabilities have been linked to Hav-RAT campaigns?
Campaigns distributing Hav-RAT droppers have exploited shortcut and document flaws including CVE-2010-2568 and CVE-2012-0158.
How can systems be safeguarded against Hav-RAT infections?
Enforce firewall egress filtering on non-standard TCP ports, deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR), and audit registry Run keys.
How do I remove the Hav_Rat Rat from Windows?
Manual removal of Hav_Rat is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Hav_Rat a virus or a Rat?
Hav_Rat is classified as a Rat. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Hav_Rat typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Hav_Rat infection?
Symptoms of Hav_Rat can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Rats
Want to prevent Hav_Rat and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Backdoor & RAT Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/hav_rat.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.