Redaman

Overview

Executive Summary

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

• Evasion and Anti-Analysis: Redaman is notorious for its anti-analysis checks. Before executing its primary payload, it verifies the default system language (often terminating if the system is not using a targeted language like Russian), checks for the presence of virtual machines (VMware, VirtualBox), and attempts to detect active debugging tools.
• Web Injection and Credential Theft: The core functionality relies on Man-in-the-Browser (MitB) attacks. Redaman hooks into web browsers to intercept traffic, injecting malicious HTML/JavaScript into legitimate banking websites. This allows it to steal login credentials, intercept two-factor authentication (2FA) SMS codes, and silently alter transaction details in real-time.
• Clipboard and Keystroke Logging: The trojan actively monitors the system clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and logs all keystrokes to capture sensitive data outside of the browser environment.

Threat Assessment

Remediation and Eradication

• Immediate Network Containment: The infected machine must be immediately physically disconnected from the network to halt active financial data exfiltration and prevent the trojan from pivoting to other high-value targets (like financial controllers).
• Financial Account Lockdown: Immediately notify the organization's financial institutions to freeze all associated corporate accounts and closely monitor for unauthorized wire transfers or ACH transactions.
• System Wipe and Re-image: Due to Redaman's deep system hooks and advanced persistence mechanisms, attempting to clean the infection is highly risky. The only guaranteed method of eradication is a complete wipe and re-image of the compromised host from a known good baseline.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan-Banker.Win32.Redaman
• Banker.RTM
• Win32/Redaman

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1056.004: Monitor for unauthorized keylogging, screen capturing, or web browser API hooking. Deploy EDR to detect API hooking.
• T1185: Enforce strong MFA and use browser isolation or hardened browsers for sensitive financial or administrative portals to defeat session hijacking.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_REDAMAN_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Redaman"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "redaman" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan-banker.win32.redaman" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "banker.rtm" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/redaman" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Redaman (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: dbe13929-a43d-5395-b791-71a1c2fd6d5a
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Redaman malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/redaman
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1185
- attack.t1114
- attack.t1056_004
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_REDAMAN_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Redaman tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "redaman" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Sever network connectivity for the flagged endpoint to terminate persistent command-and-control (C2) communication channels and stop Redaman from retrieving secondary stage payloads.
2. Capture process memory triage to detect and terminate malicious threads injected by Redaman into legitimate system processes such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe.
3. Audit Windows Registry Run keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) and Task Scheduler entries to locate and purge Redaman persistence hooks.
4. Deploy updated enterprise EDR detection signatures and conduct an out-of-band endpoint scan to isolate dropped binaries and staged payloads.
5. Rotate all credentials, domain user passwords, and session cookies active on the system during the Redaman execution timeframe.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Redaman dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Redaman until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "redaman" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "redaman" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "redaman" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Hkautoit
• Staser
• Xmrminer
• Tsklnk
• Bozok
• Jbonblanc
• Peepviewer
• Murofet

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/redaman.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.