Driverpack

Overview

DriverPack (DriverPack Solution, recognized across endpoint security engines as PUA:Win32/DriverPack, Adware:Win32/DriverPack, and PUP.Optional.DriverPackSolution) is an aggressive potentially unwanted application (PUA) and software bundler that claims to automate device driver updates on Windows systems. Distributed through deceptive download portals, torrent packages, and sponsored installers, DriverPack forcefully changes web browser default search engines, injects desktop advertising banners, and downloads unauthorized third-party bloatware applications and browser extensions without explicit user consent.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• PUA:Win32/DriverPack
• Adware:Win32/DriverPack
• PUP.Optional.DriverPackSolution
• Win32/DriverPack.Adware
• DriverPackSolution.PUP

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Driver Updater Bundler Frameworks

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Driverpack Online · Driverpack Solution 17 · Driverpack Bundler

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1566.002: Inspect email links for known malicious domains and use link-rewriting services for time-of-click analysis.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2015-1641 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a
• 1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b

Delivery vectors

• Deceptive search engine ads pointing to mirrored driver download repositories
• Third-party freeware download hosting portals using sponsored installer wrappers

Persistence mechanisms

• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DriverPackNotifier
• Scheduled Task created via schtasks /create /tn 'DriverPackScan' /tr '%ProgramFiles%\DriverPack\notifier.exe'

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_DRIVERPACK_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Driverpack"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "driverpack" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "pua:win32/driverpack" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "adware:win32/driverpack" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pup.optional.driverpacksolution" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/driverpack.adware" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "driverpacksolution.pup" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Driverpack (Pua) Execution & Triage
id: 743ac5a0-84bc-5dbd-a4d0-4f78ce1c4ebd
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Driverpack malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary
  user directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/driverpack
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.pua
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1566_002
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1053_005
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_DRIVERPACK_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Driverpack tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "driverpack" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Terminate active DriverPack background services and installer processes.
2. Delete scheduled tasks created under Microsoft\Windows\DriverPack using schtasks /delete commands.
3. Remove persistence registry entries under HKCU and HKLM Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
4. Reset browser homepages and search providers to corporate defaults across all installed browsers.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not download third-party driver updaters, as official vendor drivers should be retrieved from manufacturer sites.
2. Avoid running software installers that use dark patterns to install sponsored software.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - PUA:Win32/DriverPack
• Malwarebytes Labs Threat Intelligence - PUP.Optional.DriverPack
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2015-1641
• Search "driverpack" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "driverpack" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "driverpack" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Pua)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Downloadshield
• Vittalia
• Icloader
• Gamemodding
• Dlguide
• Domaiq
• Installmonster
• Cloudwrapper

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/driverpack.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.