Phonerooter

Overview

Executive Summary

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

• Vulnerability Exploitation: The tool scans the device's hardware architecture and Android OS version, then deploys a specific, known exploit (e.g., "Dirty COW," "PingPongRoot") targeting a flaw in the Linux kernel or a specific hardware driver.
• Privilege Escalation: If the exploit is successful, the tool bypasses the Android Application Sandbox, elevating its privileges from a standard application to a highly privileged kernel-level process.
• SU Binary Installation: It remounts the system partition as read/write and installs the `su` (superuser) binary and a root management app (like SuperSU), permanently breaking the security model and allowing any application (with permission) to execute arbitrary commands.

Threat Assessment

Incident Response and Remediation

• MDM Enforcement (Automated Isolation): Enterprise MDM solutions (e.g., Intune, Workspace ONE) must be configured with strict compliance policies that constantly monitor for "Jailbroken/Rooted" status. If detected, the MDM should automatically revoke corporate access, wipe corporate data, and quarantine the device from the network.
• Device Wipe (Factory Reset): A device that has been rooted using an exploit cannot be trusted. The only secure remediation is a complete factory reset, which restores the original, uncompromised system partition from the manufacturer's recovery image.
• Policy Review: Reiterate corporate BYOD policies regarding unauthorized device modifications and enforce strict conditional access based on device health attestation.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• HackTool.AndroidRoot
• Exploit.Android.Rooter
• Tool.KingoRoot

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_PHONEROOTER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Phonerooter"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "phonerooter" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hacktool.androidroot" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "exploit.android.rooter" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "tool.kingoroot" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Phonerooter (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: 9f0aa162-3cb3-5fbf-8d75-dd81586f469e
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Phonerooter malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary
  user directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/phonerooter
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1404
- attack.t1636
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_PHONEROOTER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Phonerooter tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "phonerooter" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Sever network connectivity for the flagged endpoint to terminate persistent command-and-control (C2) communication channels and stop Phonerooter from retrieving secondary stage payloads.
2. Capture process memory triage to detect and terminate malicious threads injected by Phonerooter into legitimate system processes such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe.
3. Audit Windows Registry Run keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) and Task Scheduler entries to locate and purge Phonerooter persistence hooks.
4. Deploy updated enterprise EDR detection signatures and conduct an out-of-band endpoint scan to isolate dropped binaries and staged payloads.
5. Rotate all credentials, domain user passwords, and session cookies active on the system during the Phonerooter execution timeframe.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Phonerooter dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Phonerooter until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "phonerooter" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "phonerooter" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "phonerooter" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Winevar
• Sixxpack
• Juicypotato
• Seznam
• Vbcryptent
• Hue
• Montague
• Genericrxby

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/phonerooter.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.