Malmaker

Overview

Executive Summary

Technical Architecture and Capabilities

• Payload Customization: The attacker can input their specific Command-and-Control (C2) IP address, configure persistence mechanisms (e.g., choose which registry key to modify), and select which features (like keylogging or screen capture) to enable in the generated trojan.
• Built-in Obfuscation: Advanced builders include crypters and packers. These algorithms encrypt the core malicious code, ensuring the generated executable has a unique cryptographic hash and bypasses static antivirus signatures.
• Icon and Extension Spoofing: The builder allows the attacker to disguise the final executable by applying the icon of a legitimate program (like MS Word or Adobe Reader) and utilizing techniques (like Right-to-Left Override) to spoof the file extension.

Threat Impact

Incident Response and Advanced Analysis

• Immediate Network Isolation: Isolate the endpoint immediately. The presence of a builder implies the user has deep malicious intent or the machine is fully controlled by an external attacker.
• Forensic Code Extraction: Do not simply delete the builder. Forensic analysts must extract the configuration files associated with the Malmaker utility to understand what specific malware payloads were being generated and to identify the C2 infrastructure the attacker was configuring.
• Enterprise-Wide Sweeps: If a builder generated a custom trojan, that trojan was likely deployed within the environment. Use the IOCs extracted from the builder to perform a massive sweep of the entire network to locate the deployed payloads.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• HackTool.Malmaker
• Riskware.MalwareBuilder
• Trojan.Builder

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_MALMAKER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Malmaker"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "malmaker" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hacktool.malmaker" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "riskware.malwarebuilder" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.builder" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Malmaker (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: 13fd9893-3b1e-5ddb-8859-146536ebdeb9
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Malmaker malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/malmaker
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1587_001
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1566_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_MALMAKER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Malmaker tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "malmaker" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate affected host(s) from the internal network (disconnect physical Ethernet and disable Wi-Fi/Bluetooth) to prevent Malmaker from spreading laterally or encrypting network-attached storage (NAS) and shared SMB volumes.
2. Preserve volatile system memory (RAM capture) on a representative endpoint before attempting a reboot or power-down, as Malmaker symmetric encryption keys or uncompiled payload components may still reside in memory.
3. Audit process execution logs and terminate active scripting interpreters (e.g. PowerShell, CMD, WScript) or commands executing 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows' or 'wbadmin' used by Malmaker to inhibit recovery.
4. Investigate the initial compromise vector (such as exposed RDP instances, spearphishing attachments, or vulnerable edge gateways) and enforce an immediate credential reset for all compromised Active Directory accounts.
5. Restore critical assets and databases exclusively from verified, air-gapped, or immutable offline backups once the Malmaker binary and related persistence hooks are eradicated.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not restart or power cycle infected systems prematurely; doing so destroys volatile RAM encryption keys and may trigger bootloader locking logic embedded in Malmaker.
2. Avoid negotiating or paying the extortion demand without prior forensic evaluation and consultation with incident response specialists, as payment does not guarantee data recovery.
3. Do not connect clean backup drives or external storage to the affected network until Malmaker eradication is completely verified.

References & External Analysis

• Search "malmaker" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "malmaker" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "malmaker" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Venik
• Brresmon
• Weenloc
• Peals
• Cryptexe
• Bomka
• Shopperpro
• Libie

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/malmaker.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.