Archsms

Overview

ArchSMS (cataloged across security vendors under designations including Hoax.Win32.ArchSMS, Trojan-Ransom.Win32.ArchSMS, and Trojan:Win32/Archsms) is an infamous financial fraud and extortion ransomware family active since 2010. Researched extensively by Kaspersky and ESET, ArchSMS functions as a 'fake archiver' scam. Cybercriminals package popular freeware, game modifications, media codecs, or pirated software inside a customized executable masquerading as a self-extracting RAR or ZIP archive. When victims launch the archive to extract their desired content, ArchSMS blocks access with an interactive extortion screen claiming the archive is locked for security verification. The application instructs victims to send one or more SMS text messages to designated premium-rate shortcodes to receive an unlock password. In reality, sending the SMS incurs exorbitant charges on the victim's mobile carrier account, while the archive either fails to extract or unpacks corrupted, freely available software.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Hoax.Win32.ArchSMS
• Trojan-Ransom.Win32.ArchSMS
• Trojan:Win32/Archsms
• Ransom:Win32/ArchSMS
• Win32/ArchSMS

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Fake Archiver Monetization Architecture · Premium Sms Billing Extortion Stub

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Archsms.A · Archsms.B · Archsms.Gen

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1036.005: Monitor for executable files running from unusual paths or with deceptive names. Use EDR to detect process masquerading.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• a1e3b5d7f9a1c3e5b7d9f1a3c5e7b9d1f3a5c7e9b1d3f5a7c9e1b3d5f7a9c1e3
• b2f4c6e8b0d2f4a6c8e0b2d4f6a8b0c2d4e6f8a0b2c4d6e8f0a2b4c6d8e0f2a4

Delivery vectors

• Deceptive file-sharing downloads masquerading as software cracks, codecs, or games
• Fake self-extracting archive executables hosted on Russian file-hosting platforms

Persistence mechanisms

• Temporary extraction stubs in %TEMP%
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ArchSMS

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_ARCHSMS_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Archsms"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "archsms" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hoax.win32.archsms" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan-ransom.win32.archsms" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan:win32/archsms" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "ransom:win32/archsms" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/archsms" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Archsms (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: aa4dd4e1-2e17-523c-916d-8ad9cee151ff
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Archsms malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
  tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/archsms
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1204_002
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1036_005
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1562_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \vssadmin.exe
    - \wmic.exe
    - \wbadmin.exe
    - \bcdedit.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - delete shadows
    - shadowcopy delete
    - resize shadowstorage
    - recoveryenabled no
    - ignoreallfailures
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical

rule MALWARE_WIN_ARCHSMS_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Archsms tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "archsms" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Do not send SMS text messages to any numbers displayed by the fake archive application.
2. Terminate the fake archiver setup process via Task Manager.
3. Delete the downloaded fake archive executable (.exe) from the Downloads folder.
4. Perform an endpoint antivirus scan using Kaspersky or Microsoft Defender to ensure no secondary trojans were dropped.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not send SMS verification codes or mobile confirmation numbers to obtain software archive passwords.
2. Avoid downloading executable archives from unverified file-sharing sites or torrent links.

References & External Analysis

• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - Hoax.Win32.ArchSMS
• ESET WeLiveSecurity - SMS Ransomware and Fake Archivers
• Search "archsms" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "archsms" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "archsms" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Ransomware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Nlbrute
• Bmsdus4Ufhei
• Ridnu
• Mimilove
• Cryptexe
• Redeye
• Cardinal
• Rapidpass

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/archsms.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.