Hydrapos

Overview

HydraPOS (classified in threat intelligence feeds as Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS and Trojan-POS.Win32.Hydra) is a specialized Point-of-Sale (POS) memory scraping malware family engineered to infiltrate retail, hospitality, and payment processing endpoints. Injected into memory spaces of payment handling processes (such as POS terminal transaction executables), HydraPOS continuously scans process memory buffers using regular expressions matching Track 1 and Track 2 magnetic stripe payment card data (including primary account numbers, cardholder names, expiration dates, and service codes) before the data is encrypted for transit. The harvested card data is stored in memory, encrypted using XOR/AES, and exfiltrated over covert HTTP/HTTPS channels or DNS tunneling to remote cybercrime infrastructure.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS
• Trojan-POS.Win32.Hydra
• PWS:Win32/HydraPOS
• HydraPOS Memory Scraper
• Win32/HydraPOS

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_HYDRAPOS_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Hydrapos"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "hydrapos" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/hydrapos" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan-pos.win32.hydra" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pws:win32/hydrapos" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "hydrapos memory scraper" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/hydrapos" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Hydrapos (Pos Malware) Execution & Triage
id: 1d84d287-42ce-5ea8-bb2c-01cd450c7f0e
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Hydrapos malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/hydrapos
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.pos-malware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1005
- attack.t1057
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1041
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_HYDRAPOS_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Hydrapos tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "hydrapos" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Instantly sever the network connection of any suspected infected POS terminal, but leave it powered on to preserve RAM evidence.
2. Initiate a PCI forensic investigation; capture a live memory image of the infected terminal to analyze the scraping mechanism and extract the unencrypted C2 configuration.
3. Analyze firewall logs to identify the external IP addresses the POS terminal was communicating with, and block them.
4. Force a global password reset for all remote access systems (RDP, LogMeIn, VNC) used by vendors or IT staff to access the retail network.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not reboot the POS terminal; doing so destroys the volatile memory evidence (RAM) crucial for understanding the attack.
2. Avoid using the infected terminal for any further transactions; every swipe is actively being stolen.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/HydraPOS
• Trend Micro Security Research - POS RAM Scraper Analysis
• MITRE ATT&CK - Data from Local System (T1005)
• Search "hydrapos" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "hydrapos" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "hydrapos" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Pos Malware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Kasidet

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/hydrapos.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.