Autophyte

Overview

Autophyte (classified in antivirus detection telemetry under designations including Trojan:Win32/Autophyte, Trojan.Win32.Autophyte, and Win32/Autophyte) is a multi-stage trojan engineered to disguise itself as legitimate software, execute unauthorized commands, and coordinate with external command-and-control infrastructure. Disseminated across enterprise networks and consumer workstations via social engineering, phishing attachments, malicious drive-by downloads, or weaponized software cracks, Autophyte executes an initial reconnaissance phase upon system ingress. The binary evaluates host privileges, detects active hypervisors and sandbox environments to evade behavioral analysis, and establishes resilient autostart persistence by configuring registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or registering background Windows services. Operational mechanics characteristic of this family include deceptive executable masquerading, registry run key autostart, system telemetry gathering, and remote C2 beaconing. Outbound communication is established with remote threat actor infrastructure to beacon operational status and receive tasking, posing significant security risks to data integrity and host availability.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Macro.Word.Autophyte
• W97M.Autophyte
• Virus.MSWord.Autophyte
• Trojan:Win32/Autophyte
• Trojan.Win32.Autophyte
• Win32/Autophyte

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1059.005: Restrict execution of scripting languages such as PowerShell, VBScript, or Python to authorized administrators. Enforce Script Block Logging.
• T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_AUTOPHYTE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Autophyte"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "autophyte" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "macro.word.autophyte" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "w97m.autophyte" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "virus.msword.autophyte" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan:win32/autophyte" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "trojan.win32.autophyte" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "win32/autophyte" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Autophyte (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: efdfcae7-dc0f-5e83-a599-eaf6a3c0a029
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Autophyte malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/autophyte
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_AUTOPHYTE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Autophyte tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "autophyte" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Enforce forensic network isolation on all suspected endpoints while maintaining an out-of-band telemetry conduit to capture live Autophyte adversary activity.
2. Perform full memory dumps across identified staging nodes to extract memory-only implants, kernel rootkit hooks, and decrypted Autophyte C2 infrastructure IP/domain lists.
3. Review Active Directory domain controller authentication logs for anomalous Kerberos ticket requests (Pass-the-Ticket, Golden Ticket) and unauthorized DCSync operations associated with Autophyte.
4. Block all confirmed C2 domains, dynamic DNS endpoints, and proxy IP addresses across perimeter firewalls, proxies, and DNS security gateways.
5. Conduct an enterprise-wide sweep across surrounding subnets for secondary webshells, WMI event subscriptions, or remote execution tooling left behind by Autophyte operators.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Autophyte dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Autophyte until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/Autophyte
• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - Trojan.Win32.Autophyte
• MITRE ATT&CK - Enterprise Techniques
• Search "autophyte" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "autophyte" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "autophyte" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Zdowbot
• Zepfod
• Messiah
• Ganelp
• Occamy
• Disfa
• Revetrat
• Cashfiesta

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/autophyte.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.