Loadmoney

Overview

LoadMoney (cataloged across cybersecurity vendors as Adware:Win32/LoadMoney, PUA:Win32/LoadMoney, and PUP.Optional.LoadMoney) is a Russian-origin pay-per-install (PPI) software monetization platform and adware distribution wrapper. Designed to monetize freeware distribution networks, LoadMoney packages legitimate third-party software, media files, and utilities within a deceptive multi-tier downloader client. When executed, the LoadMoney wrapper connects to monetization servers, obfuscates the true payload download behind aggressive advertising dialogs, forcefully installs browser extensions and search redirectors, and drops secondary adware components onto the victim's machine to generate fraudulent advertising revenue.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Adware:Win32/LoadMoney
• PUA:Win32/LoadMoney
• PUP.Optional.LoadMoney
• Win32/LoadMoney.Downloader
• LoadMoney.PPI

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Pay-Per-Install Monetization Frameworks

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Loadmoney.V1 · Loadmoney.V2 · Loadmoney Downloader

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1566.002: Inspect email links for known malicious domains and use link-rewriting services for time-of-click analysis.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2015-1641 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 3d2c1b0a9f8e7d6c5b4a3f2e1d0c9b8a7f6e5d4c3b2a1f0e9d8c7b6a5f4e3d2c
• 8c7b6a5f4e3d2c1b0a9f8e7d6c5b4a3f2e1d0c9b8a7f6e5d4c3b2a1f0e9d8c7b

Delivery vectors

• Third-party freeware download hosting portals using monetized downloader wrappers
• Deceptive search engine ads pointing to mirrored utility download domains

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\LoadMoneyTray
• Scheduled Task created via schtasks /create /tn 'LoadMoneyUpdate' /tr '%LOCALAPPDATA%\LoadMoney\update.exe'

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_LOADMONEY_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Loadmoney"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "loadmoney" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "adware:win32/loadmoney" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "pua:win32/loadmoney" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pup.optional.loadmoney" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/loadmoney.downloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "loadmoney.ppi" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Loadmoney (Adware) Execution & Triage
id: 71266a8a-2ce8-538e-9252-9b266e6a17fc
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Loadmoney malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/loadmoney
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.adware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1566_002
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1176
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_LOADMONEY_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Loadmoney tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "loadmoney" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Terminate active LoadMoney wrapper processes via Task Manager or taskkill /f /im loadmoney.exe.
2. Purge persistence registry entries located under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
3. Remove rogue extensions and reset default search providers across all installed web browsers.
4. Perform an audit of recently installed programs and uninstall any unauthorized third-party bloatware.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not download freeware software from aggregation portals that mandate downloading specialized client loaders.
2. Avoid bypassing browser warnings regarding suspicious executable downloads from untrusted domains.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Adware:Win32/LoadMoney
• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - Adware.Win32.LoadMoney
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2015-1641
• Search "loadmoney" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "loadmoney" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "loadmoney" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Adware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Dotdo
• Funshion
• Kuaiba
• Jawego
• Vittaliaent
• Browsefox
• Asktoolbar
• Rungbu

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/loadmoney.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.