Clipspy

Overview

Executive Summary

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

• Clipboard Hooking: ClipSpy hooks into the Windows clipboard event chain (often using `SetClipboardViewer` or modern equivalents). This allows the application to be notified immediately whenever new data is copied to the clipboard by any application on the system.
• Data Parsing (Cryptojacking): Malicious use of clipboard monitors often involves regex parsing. The tool actively scans copied text for patterns matching cryptocurrency wallet addresses. If a match is found, the tool may instantly replace the victim's copied address with the attacker's wallet address, ensuring any subsequent transfer goes to the attacker.
• Credential Harvesting: If users utilize password managers but fail to use auto-fill (resorting to copy-pasting passwords), the clipboard monitor will capture the plaintext credentials before they are pasted into the login prompt.

Threat Assessment

Incident Response and Remediation

• Investigate the Source: Determine how the tool was introduced to the environment. If it was installed by an employee, investigate for potential insider threat activity. If dropped by another process, a broader malware infection is underway.
• Comprehensive Credential Reset: If the tool was active, it must be assumed that any password copied on that machine has been compromised. All relevant credentials must be reset immediately.
• Process Termination and Removal: The tool can typically be removed using standard enterprise anti-malware solutions. Ensure that any associated persistence mechanisms (like registry `Run` keys or Scheduled Tasks) that launch the monitor at boot are completely purged.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Riskware.ClipSpy
• HackTool.ClipboardMonitor
• PUP.ClipSpy

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056: Monitor for unauthorized keylogging, screen capturing, or web browser API hooking. Deploy EDR to detect API hooking.
• T1059.001: Restrict execution of PowerShell. Enforce PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and Script Block Logging.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_CLIPSPY_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Clipspy"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "clipspy" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "riskware.clipspy" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "hacktool.clipboardmonitor" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pup.clipspy" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Clipspy (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: 851ebd7c-436c-5dfa-88c2-2a34a04ac538
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Clipspy malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/clipspy
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1115
- attack.t1056
- attack.t1059_001
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_CLIPSPY_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Clipspy tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "clipspy" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Enforce forensic network isolation on all suspected endpoints while maintaining an out-of-band telemetry conduit to capture live Clipspy adversary activity.
2. Perform full memory dumps across identified staging nodes to extract memory-only implants, kernel rootkit hooks, and decrypted Clipspy C2 infrastructure IP/domain lists.
3. Review Active Directory domain controller authentication logs for anomalous Kerberos ticket requests (Pass-the-Ticket, Golden Ticket) and unauthorized DCSync operations associated with Clipspy.
4. Block all confirmed C2 domains, dynamic DNS endpoints, and proxy IP addresses across perimeter firewalls, proxies, and DNS security gateways.
5. Conduct an enterprise-wide sweep across surrounding subnets for secondary webshells, WMI event subscriptions, or remote execution tooling left behind by Clipspy operators.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Clipspy dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Clipspy until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "clipspy" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "clipspy" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "clipspy" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Advanced Threat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Rontokbr
• Stalk
• Fakehack
• Proinstall
• Turla
• Zenosearch
• Globalupdate
• Hostschanger

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/clipspy.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.