Filetour

Overview

FileTour (cataloged across threat telemetry as Trojan:Win32/Filetour, Adware.FileTour, and PUA:Win32/Filetour) is a dual-function software bundler and stealth cryptocurrency miner loader documented by Microsoft Defender, BleepingComputer, and Malwarebytes. Tied to Russian pay-per-install (PPI) affiliate programs such as MoneyInst and InstallRed, FileTour spreads packaged inside pirated game cracks, application keygens, and unofficial utility patchers. In addition to dropping intrusive adware toolbars and hijacking browser homepages, aggressive FileTour variants spawn hidden, offscreen or headless browser processes (such as Google Chrome) during user sessions. These headless processes execute JavaScript-based Monero coinminers in the background, consuming substantial CPU resources while evading traditional task manager scrutiny through process camouflage.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Filetour
• Adware.FileTour
• PUA:Win32/Filetour
• PUP.Optional.FileTour
• Trojan.Filetour
• Win32/FileTour.A

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Russian_Ppi_Filetour_Network

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Filetour.Gen · Trojan.Filetour · Filetour!Rfn

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b
• 8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c

Delivery vectors

• Trojanized game cracks, key generators, and pirated software archives
• Spear-phishing emails delivering weaponized Office documents (CVE-2017-0199)

Persistence mechanisms

• Randomized Windows Scheduled Tasks executing hidden browser instances
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\FileTourService

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_FILETOUR_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Filetour"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "filetour" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/filetour" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "adware.filetour" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pua:win32/filetour" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "pup.optional.filetour" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "trojan.filetour" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "win32/filetour.a" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Filetour (Pua) Execution & Triage
id: daa7902e-7afa-5048-8011-b8a25389754a
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Filetour malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/filetour
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.pua
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1053_005
- attack.t1496
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1082
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_FILETOUR_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Filetour tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "filetour" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disconnect the endpoint from the network to sever the Stratum protocol connection, immediately halting the cryptomining activity.
2. Utilize EDR or memory forensics to identify and terminate the legitimate processes (like <code>svchost.exe</code>) that have been injected with the mining payload.
3. Audit the firewall logs to identify the mining pool IP addresses and block them enterprise-wide.
4. Perform a full system sweep to remove the vast amount of secondary adware and bundleware dropped by the FileTour installer.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not trust Task Manager to identify the malicious process; FileTour actively hooks APIs to hide its CPU usage or pauses when monitoring tools are opened.
2. Avoid leaving the machine in a prolonged infected state, as the extreme thermal stress caused by cryptomining can cause hardware failure.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/Filetour
• BleepingComputer - FileTour Bundler Drops Stealth Cryptocurrency Miners
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-0199
• Search "filetour" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "filetour" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "filetour" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Pua)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Appset
• Optimizer
• Driverupdate
• 4Shared
• Vittalia
• Ytddownloader
• Dlguide
• Pupstudio

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/filetour.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.