Himera
Table of Contents
Overview
Executive Summary
Himera (or Himera Stealer) is a commercially available Information Stealer (Info-Stealer) sold on underground cybercrime forums. It provides threat actors with a low-cost, effective tool designed to rapidly extract sensitive data, credentials, and financial information from compromised Windows endpoints before the victim realizes they have been infected.Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities
Himera is distributed through various vectors, primarily malspam campaigns containing weaponized Office documents (macros), disguised as cracked software on torrent sites, or via malicious links in YouTube tutorial descriptions (often promising free game cheats). Upon execution, it performs a rapid, highly aggressive data harvesting operation:- Browser Data Extraction: It specifically targets Chromium and Gecko-based web browsers to extract saved passwords, autofill data, credit card numbers, and session cookies (allowing attackers to bypass MFA).
- Cryptocurrency Wallet Theft: Himera actively searches the filesystem for desktop cryptocurrency wallets (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero, etc.), stealing the `wallet.dat` files and associated authentication tokens.
- System Profiling and Exfiltration: It collects extensive system details (hardware specs, installed software, IP address), grabs a desktop screenshot, and packages all stolen data into a compressed archive. This archive is then exfiltrated via HTTP POST requests or directly to a Telegram bot controlled by the attacker.
Threat Assessment
A Himera Stealer infection is a critical data breach. The malware is designed to execute quickly; by the time the initial executable is detected by standard antivirus, the data exfiltration has usually already completed. The stolen session tokens and credentials can be immediately used to access corporate networks or drain financial accounts.Incident Response and Remediation
- Global Credential Reset: The absolute highest priority is a complete password reset. ALL credentials saved in the user's browser, as well as their domain password, must be changed immediately from a *different, clean device*.
- MFA Token Revocation: Assume session cookies were stolen. Force an immediate sign-out of all active sessions for critical web applications (O365, Google Workspace, Slack, Discord) to invalidate the stolen tokens.
- Endpoint Eradication: While the primary malware executable can often be removed by EDR, the extent of the data breach necessitates a full forensic review. Re-imaging the machine is highly recommended to ensure no secondary backdoors were deployed during the infection.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | Unknown | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie (Abusing active authenticated sessions to perform social media fraud) | Credential Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1056.001 | Keylogging | Credential Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Exfiltration | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-NDF | Network Data Filtering | Isolate | T1048 | Inspect non-standard port traffic and block unauthorized ICMP or DNS tunneling protocols at the network perimeter. |
D3-MFA | Multi-factor Authentication | Harden | T1056.001 | Enforce FIDO2 / WebAuthn physical tokens to render keystroke-intercepted passwords useless. |
D3-CVH | Credential Vault Hardening | Harden | T1555.003 | Enable DPAPI master key audit logging and isolate browser SQLite database files within virtualization-based security containers. |
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_HIMERA_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Himera"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "himera" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "trojan.himera" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "pws.himera" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "trojanspy.himerastealer" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Himera (Backdoor) Execution & Triage
id: 3c198df4-0ed3-5eda-ac77-8a2c38246c7f
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Himera malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/himera
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.backdoor
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1539
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1048
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \cmd.exe
- \rundll32.exe
- \regsvr32.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- DownloadString
- IEX(
- '/s /n /u /i:'
- sc create
- start-process
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: highTier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_HIMERA_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Himera tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "himera" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Immediately isolate the compromised host from internal LAN and WAN environments to cut off interactive remote shell sessions established by Himera.
- Inspect active socket listeners and outbound established network connections ('netstat -ano') to identify and sever covert TCP/UDP channels used by Himera.
- Scan Windows Services, Scheduled Tasks, and Startup folders to locate and eliminate persistent backdoor listeners configured by Himera.
- Invalidate all active VPN profiles, local administrator credentials, and session tokens that may have been harvested by the Himera operator.
- Re-image the affected host using a validated golden image prior to reconnecting it to enterprise network segments.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not attempt to interact with or send messages through the Himera remote terminal, as this alerts the attacker and may cause them to execute destructive anti-forensic commands.
- Avoid relying solely on static file signatures, as Himera payloads frequently execute reflectively in memory without writing binaries to disk.
References & External Analysis
- Search "himera" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "himera" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "himera" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Himera and what threat category does it belong to?
Himera is classified as a Backdoor. Documented across security telemetry, it is engineered to execute unauthorized operations, establish persistent footholds on target endpoints, and facilitate malicious campaigns targeting enterprise and individual environments.
How does Himera establish persistence and evade defensive controls?
Himera typically establishes persistence through registry run keys, scheduled tasks, or service installations, while evading signature-based antivirus solutions through code obfuscation, memory injection, or anti-analysis sandbox checks.
What are the essential incident response steps for mitigating a Himera compromise?
Security teams responding to Himera should immediately isolate affected endpoints from the network, perform memory triage to capture volatile forensic artifacts, audit registry and startup persistence mechanisms, revoke exposed user credentials, and restore systems from verified, clean backups.
What remote administrative and surveillance capabilities does Trojan.Himera provide to threat actors?
As an interactive backdoor and remote access tool, Trojan.Himera grants operators comprehensive control over the victim host. Common surveillance and management modules include real-time keystroke logging, desktop screen capture, remote VNC streaming, webcam and audio recording, arbitrary shell command execution, reverse proxy pivoting, and bidirectional file transfer capabilities.
How does Trojan.Himera traverse firewalls and sustain resilient command-and-control (C2) connections?
Trojan.Himera establishes persistent outbound TCP or TLS connections back to threat actor infrastructure, effectively bypassing inbound firewall filtering. To maintain connection resilience against IP takedowns, variants frequently employ dynamic DNS services, fallback command servers, encrypted dead-drop resolvers on social platforms, or DNS over HTTPS (DoH) querying.
How do I remove the Himera Backdoor from Windows?
Manual removal of Himera is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Himera a virus or a Backdoor?
Himera is classified as a Backdoor. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Himera typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Himera infection?
Symptoms of Himera can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Backdoors
Want to prevent Himera and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Backdoor & RAT Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/himera.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.