Browserpassview

Overview

Browserpassview (classified in antivirus detection telemetry under designations including PWS:Win32/Browserpassview, PWS.Win32.Browserpassview, and Win32/Browserpassview) is a dedicated information theft malware engineered to harvest stored credentials, browser session cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and keystrokes. Disseminated across enterprise networks and consumer workstations via social engineering, phishing attachments, malicious drive-by downloads, or weaponized software cracks, Browserpassview executes an initial reconnaissance phase upon system ingress. The binary evaluates host privileges, detects active hypervisors and sandbox environments to evade behavioral analysis, and establishes resilient autostart persistence by configuring registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or registering background Windows services. Operational mechanics characteristic of this family include credential database extraction, API hooking, system discovery, and encrypted C2 exfiltration. Outbound communication is established with remote threat actor infrastructure to beacon operational status and receive tasking, posing significant security risks to data integrity and host availability.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• PWS:Win32/Browserpassview
• PWS.Win32.Browserpassview
• Win32/Browserpassview

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1003.001: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.
• T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_BROWSERPASSVIEW_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Browserpassview"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "browserpassview" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "pws:win32/browserpassview" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "pws.win32.browserpassview" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/browserpassview" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Browserpassview (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: 070dc79b-4810-51fb-bea3-740195891e4c
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Browserpassview malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting,
  master key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/browserpassview
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1114
- attack.t1041
- attack.t1082
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_BROWSERPASSVIEW_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Browserpassview tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "browserpassview" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Immediately isolate the endpoint; assume all credentials stored in the user's browsers (including corporate SSO, VPN, and personal accounts) are fully compromised.
2. Initiate an emergency, mandatory password reset for the affected user across all corporate systems and services.
3. Analyze EDR telemetry to trace the parent process that launched the tool to identify the initial access vector (e.g., a phishing payload).
4. Review network logs (Proxy/DNS) to identify where the dumped credential file was exfiltrated (e.g., FTP upload or HTTP POST).

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the attack stopped with browser credentials; attackers almost always deploy additional tools to dump LSASS (Mimikatz) concurrently.
2. Avoid allowing users to save corporate passwords in web browsers; enforce the use of enterprise-managed, encrypted password managers.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - PWS:Win32/Browserpassview
• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - PWS.Win32.Browserpassview
• MITRE ATT&CK - Enterprise Techniques
• Search "browserpassview" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "browserpassview" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "browserpassview" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Infostealer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Pony
• Azorult
• Urelas
• Agenttesla
• Steam
• Lokibot
• Olgames
• Chisburg

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/browserpassview.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.