Eyestye

Overview

EyeStye (cataloged across security vendors under signatures including PWS:Win32/EyeStye, Trojan:Win32/EyeStye, and Worm:Win32/EyeStye) is a specialized password-stealing trojan and rootkit threat active since 2010. Engineered to compromise online banking accounts, payment portals, and enterprise web applications, EyeStye hooks Windows networking APIs and web browser processes to execute form-grabbing attacks, intercepting sensitive usernames, plaintext passwords, and credit card data before transport encryption occurs. To maintain stealth, EyeStye incorporates kernel-mode and user-mode rootkit modules that conceal its running processes, disk files, and registry entries from standard Windows task monitoring utilities and security software. The malware also includes secondary downloader routines that receive remote commands to update its configuration or download secondary malicious tools such as cryptocurrency clippers and remote access proxies.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• PWS:Win32/EyeStye
• Trojan:Win32/EyeStye
• Worm:Win32/EyeStye
• Win32/EyeStye

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Classic Win32 Password Stealers

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Eyestye.A · Eyestye.B · Eyestye.Rootkit

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2
• a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0

Delivery vectors

• bank_statement.exe
• secure_reader.exe

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\EyeStyeHook
• C:\Windows\System32\drivers\eyestye.sys

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_EYESTYE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Eyestye"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "eyestye" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "pws:win32/eyestye" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan:win32/eyestye" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "worm:win32/eyestye" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/eyestye" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Eyestye (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: 436cc4f1-6f55-532b-b4a4-bbd1573f3e10
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Eyestye malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting,
  master key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/eyestye
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1566_001
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1056_004
- attack.t1055_001
- attack.t1014
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_EYESTYE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Eyestye tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "eyestye" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Instantly isolate the endpoint from the network to halt the active exfiltration of the harvested credential archives.
2. Force a global, mandatory password reset for the compromised user, prioritizing corporate VPN access, email accounts, and financial portals.
3. Capture a full forensic memory image to extract the active Eyestye payload and identify the specific C2 infrastructure it is communicating with.
4. Assume all locally saved passwords have been compromised; perform a clean OS rebuild to ensure the infostealer is completely eradicated.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow the user to type any passwords or access sensitive portals while the machine is infected, as the infostealer may include keylogging capabilities.
2. Avoid assuming the threat is contained just by removing the executable; the exfiltrated passwords must be reset globally.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - PWS:Win32/EyeStye
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - PWS.Win32.Eyestye
• Search "eyestye" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "eyestye" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "eyestye" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Infostealer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Stealc
• Mintluks
• Blackstealer
• Lokibot
• Browserpwdstealer
• Ponystealer
• Cosmicduke
• Universal1337

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/eyestye.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.