Evillocker
Table of Contents
Overview
Executive Summary
EvilLocker is a highly destructive Ransomware family designed to extort financial payment from victims by encrypting their critical data. It is known for its rapid deployment and aggressive encryption routines, prioritizing the immediate and widespread encryption of local and network-mapped drives to cause maximum operational disruption before security teams can respond.Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities
EvilLocker is typically distributed via weaponized email attachments (spear-phishing) or deployed by threat actors who have purchased RDP credentials from Initial Access Brokers (IABs) and manually executed the payload within the compromised network. Upon execution, EvilLocker initiates a standard but devastating attack sequence:- Volume Shadow Copy Deletion: Before encryption begins, the ransomware executes commands (e.g., `vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet`) to destroy local system backups and recovery points, ensuring the victim cannot easily restore their files using Windows features.
- Strong Cryptography: It utilizes strong encryption algorithms (often a combination of AES for file encryption and RSA for key encryption) to encrypt documents, databases, images, and archives. The encrypted files are usually appended with a specific, unique extension (often `.evil` or a randomized string).
- Ransom Note Generation: A text or HTML file is dropped in every directory containing encrypted files. This note provides instructions on how to purchase cryptocurrency (usually Bitcoin) and contact the attackers to obtain the decryption key.
Threat Assessment
An EvilLocker infection is a critical security incident resulting in immediate and often catastrophic loss of data availability. The destruction of local backups means that without secure, offline backups, organizations face a stark choice between massive data loss or paying a criminal extortion demand.Incident Response and Remediation
- Immediate Network Severance: The infected endpoint must be immediately disconnected from the corporate network, Wi-Fi, and any VPNs to prevent the ransomware from propagating to mapped network drives and cloud storage sync folders.
- Preserve Memory (Do Not Reboot): If possible, capture a forensic image of the system's RAM before powering it down, as the decryption key might temporarily reside in volatile memory.
- Eradication and Restoration: Paying the ransom is strongly discouraged. The only reliable remediation strategy is a complete bare-metal wipe of the infected systems and a full restoration from secure, air-gapped backups.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery (Behaviorally blocking the deletion of backups) | Impact | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1082 | System Information Discovery | Discovery | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Defense Evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-BDA | Binary De-obfuscation & Unpacking | Analyze | T1027 | Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation. |
D3-SDA | System Discovery Analysis | Detect | T1082 | Alert on rapid enumerations of systeminfo, hostname, and registry hardware trees in short intervals. |
D3-FAED | File Alteration Early Detection | Detect | T1486 | Deploy canary files and monitor mass rename/encryption I/O spikes to terminate ransomware threads immediately. |
D3-VSS | Volume Shadow & Snapshot Hardening | Harden | T1490 | Block execution of vssadmin.exe and wmic shadowcopy delete; maintain air-gapped immutable backup repositories. |
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_EVILLOCKER_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Evillocker"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "evillocker" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "ransom.evillocker" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "win32/filecoder.evil" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "trojan-ransom.win32.evillocker" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Evillocker (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: 83d4d214-23f3-5a4b-9cfa-f3cee137d587
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Evillocker malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status
tampering, and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/evillocker
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \vssadmin.exe
- \wmic.exe
- \wbadmin.exe
- \bcdedit.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- delete shadows
- shadowcopy delete
- resize shadowstorage
- recoveryenabled no
- ignoreallfailures
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_EVILLOCKER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Evillocker tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "evillocker" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Immediately isolate affected host(s) from the internal network (disconnect physical Ethernet and disable Wi-Fi/Bluetooth) to prevent Evillocker from spreading laterally or encrypting network-attached storage (NAS) and shared SMB volumes.
- Preserve volatile system memory (RAM capture) on a representative endpoint before attempting a reboot or power-down, as Evillocker symmetric encryption keys or uncompiled payload components may still reside in memory.
- Audit process execution logs and terminate active scripting interpreters (e.g. PowerShell, CMD, WScript) or commands executing 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows' or 'wbadmin' used by Evillocker to inhibit recovery.
- Investigate the initial compromise vector (such as exposed RDP instances, spearphishing attachments, or vulnerable edge gateways) and enforce an immediate credential reset for all compromised Active Directory accounts.
- Restore critical assets and databases exclusively from verified, air-gapped, or immutable offline backups once the Evillocker binary and related persistence hooks are eradicated.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not restart or power cycle infected systems prematurely; doing so destroys volatile RAM encryption keys and may trigger bootloader locking logic embedded in Evillocker.
- Avoid negotiating or paying the extortion demand without prior forensic evaluation and consultation with incident response specialists, as payment does not guarantee data recovery.
- Do not connect clean backup drives or external storage to the affected network until Evillocker eradication is completely verified.
References & External Analysis
- Search "evillocker" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "evillocker" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "evillocker" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Evillocker and what threat category does it belong to?
Evillocker is classified as a Ransomware. Documented across security telemetry, it is engineered to execute unauthorized operations, establish persistent footholds on target endpoints, and facilitate malicious campaigns targeting enterprise and individual environments.
How does Evillocker establish persistence and evade defensive controls?
Evillocker typically establishes persistence through registry run keys, scheduled tasks, or service installations, while evading signature-based antivirus solutions through code obfuscation, memory injection, or anti-analysis sandbox checks.
What are the essential incident response steps for mitigating a Evillocker compromise?
Security teams responding to Evillocker should immediately isolate affected endpoints from the network, perform memory triage to capture volatile forensic artifacts, audit registry and startup persistence mechanisms, revoke exposed user credentials, and restore systems from verified, clean backups.
What cryptographic algorithms and file targeting techniques does Ransom.EvilLocker employ during execution?
Ransom.EvilLocker typically leverages hybrid cryptographic architectures combining symmetric stream or block ciphers (such as AES-256 or ChaCha20) for rapid file encryption with asymmetric algorithms (such as RSA-2048 or Curve25519) to securely protect the session keys. It aggressively targets sensitive file extensions including corporate documents, databases, virtual disks, and backups while systematically executing commands to delete Volume Shadow Copies (vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet) and disable system recovery options.
Are decryptors available for Ransom.EvilLocker, and what is the recommended recovery procedure?
Decryption availability for Ransom.EvilLocker depends on whether security researchers or law enforcement (such as the No More Ransom initiative) have recovered the master private keys or discovered flaws in its key generation routines. Victims should never pay the extortion demand, as payment fuels criminal operations without guaranteeing file restoration. The recommended recovery procedure entails isolating infected hosts, conducting forensic disk imaging, identifying the root access vector, and restoring validated systems from immutable offline backups.
How do I remove Evillocker from Windows?
Manual removal of Evillocker is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
What are the main symptoms of a Evillocker infection?
Symptoms of Evillocker can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Ransomwares
Want to prevent Evillocker and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Ransomware Containment & Incident Response.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/evillocker.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.