Remotehack

Overview

Executive Summary

Infection Vector and Technical Capabilities

• Full System Control: The tool allows the attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands, modify the Windows Registry, stop/start system services, and manipulate the file system (uploading/downloading files).
• Surveillance and Espionage: Many variants categorized as RemoteHack include modules for live screen capture, keystroke logging, and sometimes audio/video surveillance by hijacking connected webcams or microphones.
• Persistence: The tool will typically install itself as a hidden Windows Service or add entries to the `Run` registry keys to ensure the backdoor remains accessible even after the system is rebooted.

Threat Assessment

Incident Response and Remediation

• Immediate Network Isolation: Severing the C2 connection is the absolute highest priority. Disconnect the infected machine from the network immediately to cut off the attacker's interactive access.
• Hunt for Lateral Movement: Assume the attacker has already used the tool to pivot. Incident responders must analyze network traffic logs (NetFlow, firewall logs) originating from the infected IP address to identify other potentially compromised internal hosts.
• Bare-Metal Re-imaging: Due to the extensive, interactive control a RAT provides, it is impossible to guarantee that a system has been "cleaned" manually. The attacker likely installed secondary, hidden backdoors. The only secure remediation is a complete bare-metal wipe and re-image from a trusted backup.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• HackTool.RemoteHack
• RAT.RemoteHack
• Win32/RemoteHack

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1059: Restrict execution of scripting languages such as PowerShell, VBScript, or Python to authorized administrators. Enforce Script Block Logging.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_REMOTEHACK_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Remotehack"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "remotehack" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hacktool.remotehack" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "rat.remotehack" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/remotehack" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Remotehack (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: 66a4fede-c54a-5fca-809c-dfee78e9ca84
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Remotehack malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary
  user directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/remotehack
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1105
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_REMOTEHACK_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Remotehack tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "remotehack" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Sever network connectivity for the flagged endpoint to terminate persistent command-and-control (C2) communication channels and stop Remotehack from retrieving secondary stage payloads.
2. Capture process memory triage to detect and terminate malicious threads injected by Remotehack into legitimate system processes such as explorer.exe or svchost.exe.
3. Audit Windows Registry Run keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) and Task Scheduler entries to locate and purge Remotehack persistence hooks.
4. Deploy updated enterprise EDR detection signatures and conduct an out-of-band endpoint scan to isolate dropped binaries and staged payloads.
5. Rotate all credentials, domain user passwords, and session cookies active on the system during the Remotehack execution timeframe.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Remotehack dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Remotehack until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "remotehack" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "remotehack" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "remotehack" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Pcreviver
• Dnschange
• Fakeinstaller
• Hesv
• Esfury
• Fakeplayer
• Pyspy
• Adinstaller

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/remotehack.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.