Pwdump

Overview

Executive Summary

Technical Capabilities and Abuse

• SAM Database Extraction: The Windows SAM file stores user passwords in a hashed format (LM/NTLM). Normally, the OS locks this file, preventing standard copying. Pwdump utilizes DLL injection (often targeting the `lsass.exe` process) or specialized drivers to bypass this lock and dump the hashes directly from memory or the registry.
• Offline Cracking: Once the attacker runs Pwdump, they output the results to a text file and exfiltrate it. They can then use offline cracking tools (like Hashcat or John the Ripper) to brute-force the plaintext passwords.
• Pass-the-Hash (PtH): Even without cracking the plaintext password, an attacker can use the extracted NTLM hashes directly in a "Pass-the-Hash" attack to authenticate to other servers and pivot laterally across the Active Directory domain.

Threat Assessment

Incident Response and Remediation

• Immediate Network Isolation: Isolate the compromised machine immediately to prevent the attacker from exfiltrating the dumped hashes or using them to pivot to the Domain Controller.
• Enterprise-Wide Credential Reset: If Pwdump was executed successfully, incident responders must assume that all local accounts (and potentially cached domain accounts) on that machine are compromised. A mandatory password reset must be enforced.
• Hunt for the Initial Access Vector: Pwdump is a post-exploitation tool. The investigation must focus on *how* the attacker gained the administrative privileges necessary to run it in the first place (e.g., exploiting a vulnerable service, phishing a privileged user, or lateral movement from another host).

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• HackTool.Pwdump
• Riskware.Pwdump
• Win32/Pwdump

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1003.001: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.
• T1003.002: Monitor for LSASS memory dumping or registry SAM extraction. Enable Credential Guard on Windows systems.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_PWDUMP_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Pwdump"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "pwdump" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "hacktool.pwdump" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "riskware.pwdump" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "win32/pwdump" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Pwdump (Advanced Threat) Execution & Triage
id: 534b4fd7-08f3-5f34-9d34-bbffb1f25ad8
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Pwdump malware family. Detects proxy execution, reflective DLL loading,
  and remote command injection associated with modular enterprise backdoors.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/pwdump
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.advanced-threat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1003_002
- attack.t1003_001
- attack.t1550_002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cmd.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    - \regsvr32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - DownloadString
    - IEX(
    - '/s /n /u /i:'
    - sc create
    - start-process
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_PWDUMP_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Pwdump tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "pwdump" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Enforce forensic network isolation on all suspected endpoints while maintaining an out-of-band telemetry conduit to capture live Pwdump adversary activity.
2. Perform full memory dumps across identified staging nodes to extract memory-only implants, kernel rootkit hooks, and decrypted Pwdump C2 infrastructure IP/domain lists.
3. Review Active Directory domain controller authentication logs for anomalous Kerberos ticket requests (Pass-the-Ticket, Golden Ticket) and unauthorized DCSync operations associated with Pwdump.
4. Block all confirmed C2 domains, dynamic DNS endpoints, and proxy IP addresses across perimeter firewalls, proxies, and DNS security gateways.
5. Conduct an enterprise-wide sweep across surrounding subnets for secondary webshells, WMI event subscriptions, or remote execution tooling left behind by Pwdump operators.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Pwdump dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Pwdump until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Search "pwdump" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "pwdump" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "pwdump" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Advanced Threat)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Smal
• Dlboost
• Mediana
• Zafi
• Prast
• Springtech
• Smominru
• Ohmytabs

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/pwdump.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.