Smokeloader

Overview

SmokeLoader (also cataloged in threat telemetry as Dofoil or Sharapov) is a veteran modular malware loader and botnet first commercialized in 2011 by an underground developer operating under the pseudonyms 'Smoke' and 'Sharapov'. Engineered as a turnkey payload distribution utility sold exclusively on Russian-language cybercrime forums, SmokeLoader specialized in bypassing endpoint security products and reliably staging secondary infostealers, banking trojans, and ransomware. SmokeLoader earned a reputation for formidable anti-analysis engineering: it detects virtualized sandbox environments, unhooks endpoint detection (EDR) DLLs in process memory, and injects payload shellcode directly into explorer.exe or svchost.exe. In May 2024, Europol, the FBI, the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), French Police, and the National Police of Ukraine executed 'Operation Endgame'—the largest multinational law enforcement operation against cybercrime droppers in history. Operation Endgame dismantled SmokeLoader's global network, taking down over 100 criminal servers and arresting its core operators in Ukraine and Armenia.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• SmokeLoader
• Smoke Loader
• Dofoil
• Sharapov
• Trojan.SmokeLoader
• Win32/SmokeLoader

Threat Actor Attribution

Attribution is probabilistic, not a science. Each link below states its confidence level and the evidence behind it.

• Smoke / Sharapov / Europol-FBI Operation Endgame Takedown (May 2024) High confidence
  Basis: Developed and sold by Russian developer 'Smoke'. In May 2024, Europol, the FBI, German BKA, and Ukrainian Police executed Operation Endgame, arresting key operators and seizing command servers worldwide. [source]

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Smokeloader 2011 (Initial Release) · Smokeloader 2014 (Anti-Vm Upgrade) · Smokeloader 2017 (Dll Unhooking) · Smokeloader 2020-2024 (Multi-Stage Shellcode)

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2017-0199 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2017-11882 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Command & Control (C2) and Network Profile

How this family talks to its operators. C2 traffic can often identify a family even when its code and configuration are hard to analyse. Ports and patterns are historical and change between campaigns, so use them as hunting leads rather than block-only rules.

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 2b8d0032fecbfde6dc87f7b3dfd2a5f5f4625be25633a9254d39fba0882e85ab
• 378a5e8c1b31a89c89e24e12c1b483f98c4740e2d3d0f01ba3e18a7a2fa2b23a

Delivery vectors

• Malicious spam emails containing weaponized RTF and Word attachments exploiting CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-0199
• Compromised software cracks and keygen bundles distributed on peer-to-peer websites

Persistence mechanisms

• Injection of shellcode into explorer.exe or svchost.exe
• Registry Run keys created under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run pointing to %APPDATA%

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_SMOKELOADER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Smokeloader"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "smokeloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "smokeloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "smoke loader" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "dofoil" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "sharapov" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "trojan.smokeloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "win32/smokeloader" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Smokeloader (Loader) Execution & Triage
id: 0111d55c-3372-5482-8f60-7dd5fd3069f4
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Smokeloader malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary
  user directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/smokeloader
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.loader
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1497_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_SMOKELOADER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Smokeloader tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "smokeloader" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate the host from the network immediately to prevent Smokeloader from successfully requesting and executing secondary, high-impact payloads (e.g., ransomware or banking trojans).
2. Inspect proxy and DNS telemetry to identify the download URLs and staging infrastructure contacted by Smokeloader; block these indicators enterprise-wide.
3. Audit temporary directories (%TEMP%, %APPDATA%, C:\ProgramData\) to locate and quarantine secondary executables or DLLs dropped by Smokeloader.
4. Purge startup registry keys and scheduled tasks established to re-attempt payload retrieval.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the incident is resolved simply because an antivirus tool removed the initial Smokeloader dropper; always verify that secondary payloads and persistence hooks have been eradicated.
2. Avoid logging in with Domain Admin or privileged credentials on a machine suspected of running Smokeloader until memory triage is complete.
3. Do not delay host isolation; automated lateral movement and credential dumping can occur within minutes of initial execution.

References & External Analysis

• Europol Press Release - Operation Endgame Botnet Takedown
• MITRE ATT&CK - Smoke Loader (S0226)
• German BKA - Operation Endgame Technical Report
• Search "smokeloader" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "smokeloader" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "smokeloader" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Loader)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Bazarloader
• Darkgate
• Bumblebee
• Nisloder
• Emotet
• Gamarue
• Pikabot
• Umbra

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/smokeloader.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.