Ganelp

Overview

Ganelp (cataloged across security solutions as Trojan:Win32/Ganelp, Trojan-Spy.Win32.Ganelp, and PWS:Win32/Ganelp) is a specialized password-stealing trojan and banking spyware family documented by Microsoft Defender and Trend Micro. Designed to harvest sensitive enterprise credentials, Ganelp targets stored login data in web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox), FTP clients (FileZilla, WinSCP), and email applications (Outlook, Thunderbird). It records keystrokes when banking portals are active and exfiltrates gathered credentials via encrypted HTTP POST requests to remote C2 infrastructure.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Ganelp
• Trojan-Spy.Win32.Ganelp
• PWS:Win32/Ganelp
• Win32/Ganelp.Stealer
• Spyware.Ganelp

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Win32 Password Stealer Frameworks

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Ganelp.A · Ganelp.B · Win32/Ganelp.Gen

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

• CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
• CVE-2015-1641 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e
• 9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f

Delivery vectors

• Phishing emails with malicious Office attachments exploiting CVE-2012-0158
• Watering hole drive-by downloads exploiting CVE-2015-1641

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\GanelpUpdate
• Scheduled Task created under Microsoft\Windows\GanelpScan

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_GANELP_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Ganelp"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "ganelp" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/ganelp" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan-spy.win32.ganelp" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "pws:win32/ganelp" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/ganelp.stealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "spyware.ganelp" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Ganelp (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: 6549279c-6b7b-52a0-a665-f4a7bc0dea3d
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Ganelp malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/ganelp
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1555_003
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1027
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_GANELP_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Ganelp tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "ganelp" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Isolate compromised endpoints to cut off outbound HTTP credential exfiltration streams.
2. Kill active Ganelp stealer processes running out of %APPDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA% directories.
3. Delete persistence registry entries located under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
4. Enforce immediate enterprise-wide password resets for all accounts accessed on the infected workstation.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not continue logging into enterprise portals on workstations showing signs of stealer activity.
2. Avoid relying solely on browser password storage for high-privilege administrative accounts.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/Ganelp
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - PWS.Win32.Ganelp
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2015-1641
• Search "ganelp" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "ganelp" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "ganelp" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Fuery
• Laqma
• Trojna
• Ulysses
• Inexsmar
• Genericrxfj
• Wakme
• Sz4Aaw

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/ganelp.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.