Trickster

Overview

Trickster (widely known across threat intelligence and cybersecurity communities under vendor detections including Trojan:Win32/Trickster, Trojan-Banker.Win32.Trickster, and TrickLoader) is a recognized alias and detection signature for TrickBot, the infamous modular banking trojan and malware loader operated by Russian-speaking cybercrime group WIZARD SPIDER (UNC1878). First emerging in late 2016 as a successor to Dyre, TrickBot/Trickster evolved from a financial credential stealer into one of the most sophisticated cybercrime frameworks in history, subject to official CISA Cybersecurity Advisory AA20-302A. Distributed via malicious spam (malspam) campaigns, weaponized Microsoft Office macro documents, and secondary infections from Emotet, Trickster deploys a modular architecture that dynamically downloads encrypted DLL modules from command-and-control servers. Its capabilities include web-inject banking credential theft, Active Directory and LDAP domain reconnaissance, lateral movement via EternalBlue (MS17-010) and SMB propagation, Mimikatz-based LSASS credential dumping, and staging high-impact enterprise ransomware families including Ryuk and Conti.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Trickster
• TrickBot
• TrickLoader
• Trojan-Banker.Win32.Trickster

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Dyre Banking Trojan · Zeus Trojan Family

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Trickbot Core · Trickloader · Anchor

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• b9c8d7e6f5a4b3c2d1e0f9a8b7c6d5e4f3a2b1c0d9e8f7a6b5c4d3e2f1a0b9c8
• 4a3b2c1d0e9f8a7b6c5d4e3f2a1b0c9d8e7f6a5b4c3d2e1f0a9b8c7d6e5f4a3b

Delivery vectors

• invoice_doc_macro.docm
• trickster_loader.exe

Persistence mechanisms

• schtasks /create /tn "ServiceTest" /tr "%AppData%\TrickBot\client.exe" /sc onlogon
• %AppData%\TrickBot\Data\modules

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_TRICKSTER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Trickster"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "trickster" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/trickster" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trickbot" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trickloader" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "trojan-banker.win32.trickster" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Trickster (Banking Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: 42a837ee-19c9-5d13-8fbe-40cb04aa830d
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Trickster malware family. Detects recon staging, certutil file payload
  staging, and web-inject process proxying characteristic of banking trojan initial
  loaders.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/trickster
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/banking-trojan-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.banking-trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1566_001
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1055_001
- attack.t1003_001
- attack.t1021_002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \svchost.exe
    - \explorer.exe
    - \msiexec.exe
    - \certutil.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - -urlcache
    - -split -f
    - ipconfig /all
    - route print
    - netstat -ano
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_TRICKSTER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Trickster tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "trickster" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Quarantine the endpoint to halt the continuous downloading of secondary payloads and the active exfiltration of telemetry.
2. Audit the 'Add/Remove Programs' list and manually uninstall any fake optimizers, rogue AV, or unknown applications installed recently.
3. Deploy an enterprise-grade adware removal tool to locate and strip the deep registry hooks, scheduled tasks, and forced browser policies.
4. Educate the user on recognizing deceptive malvertising and fake software updates, emphasizing that legitimate software does not use high-pressure scare tactics.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow the user to pay for any 'premium' license offered by the fake software; it is an extortion scam.
2. Avoid assuming the endpoint is clean simply because the AV quarantined the initial installer; the user likely already executed it.

References & External Analysis

• CISA Advisory AA20-302A - Ransomware Activity Targeting Healthcare (TrickBot)
• Malwarebytes Labs Threat Encyclopedia - TrickBot / Trickster
• CISA Advisory: AA20-302A
• Search "trickster" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "trickster" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "trickster" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

North American Authority Advisory (CISA / NIST)

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has published an official US federal advisory on this family, which can be mapped to NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) incident response controls: AA20-302A ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Banking Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Zusy
• Shylock
• A_311_Death
• Gozi
• Carberp
• Bancos
• Alien
• Dridex

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/trickster.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.