Dico
Table of Contents
Overview
Dico (classified across antimalware research as Ransom:Win32/Dico, Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Dico, and Ransom.Dico) is a high-impact corporate crypto-ransomware family designed for rapid and thorough enterprise extortion campaigns. Typically deployed in human-operated intrusions following initial access gained via stolen remote access credentials or phishing loaders, Dico prioritizes high-value corporate servers and storage arrays. Upon execution with elevated administrator or SYSTEM privileges, Dico initiates environmental reconnaissance, verifying domain controller connectivity and enumerating active Active Directory network resources. The ransomware uses an AES-256-CBC symmetric cipher combined with an embedded RSA-2048 public master key to encrypt documents, financial spreadsheets, databases, CAD designs, and backup archives. Encrypted files are renamed with a unique extension, and ransom notes titled `README_RESTORE_FILES.txt` are created in every folder. Dico deletes Volume Shadow Copies, clears Windows security and system event logs via wevtutil, and instructs victims to negotiate extortion payment exclusively through Tor.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Command and Control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1055 | Process Injection | Defense Evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1566.001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | Initial Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Defense Evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.
- T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-BDA | Binary De-obfuscation & Unpacking | Analyze | T1027 | Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation. |
D3-PIAD | Process Injection Analysis & Detection | Detect | T1055 | Monitor cross-process thread creation (CreateRemoteThread) and asynchronous procedure calls (QueueUserAPC). |
D3-NTI | Network Traffic Inspection | Detect | T1105 | Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
D3-FS | File Sandboxing (Attachment Detonation) | Isolate | T1566.001 | Detonate macro-enabled documents, ISOs, and password-protected archives inside an isolated hypervisor. |
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_DICO_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Dico"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "dico" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "ransom:win32/dico" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan-ransom.win32.dico" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "win32/dico" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "dico ransomware" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "ransom.dico" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Dico (Ransomware) Execution & Triage
id: e9f2173b-451e-59e4-9c82-49709aebf488
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Dico malware family. Detects volume shadow copy deletion, boot status tampering,
and recovery inhibition characteristic of modern ransomware operations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/dico
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.ransomware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1486
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1070_001
- attack.t1083
- attack.t1135
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \vssadmin.exe
- \wmic.exe
- \wbadmin.exe
- \bcdedit.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- delete shadows
- shadowcopy delete
- resize shadowstorage
- recoveryenabled no
- ignoreallfailures
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: critical
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_DICO_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Dico tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "dico" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Isolate the endpoint immediately to prevent Dico from downloading and executing its secondary payloads (e.g., ransomware).
- Audit the Windows Task Scheduler and Registry Run keys to identify and remove the Dico persistence mechanisms.
- Review firewall and proxy logs to identify the C2 domains Dico attempted to contact, and block them enterprise-wide.
- Capture a live memory image (RAM dump) to extract the injected Dico modules and identify the secondary payloads.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not close an incident simply because the initial Dico dropper was quarantined; always verify if secondary payloads were downloaded.
- Avoid relying solely on manual file deletion, as the injected processes will likely just recreate the dropped binaries.
References & External Analysis
- Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Ransom:Win32/Dico
- Sophos Threat Center - Ransom_Dico Analysis
- MITRE ATT&CK - Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001)
- Search "dico" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "dico" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "dico" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Ransom:Win32/Dico?
Dico is an enterprise crypto-ransomware family that encrypts corporate servers and workstations using AES-256 and RSA-2048.
How do threat actors deploy Dico across corporate networks?
They use compromised administrative credentials via PsExec, WMI, or Group Policy Objects (GPO) to distribute Dico to multiple hosts.
How does Dico hinder incident response analysis?
It executes wevtutil commands to clear Windows Application, Security, and System event logs, wiping forensic telemetry.
Can files encrypted by Dico be recovered without paying the ransom?
Without the attacker's private RSA key, recovery requires restoring data from isolated, unencrypted offline backups.
What security measures mitigate Dico ransomware threats?
Enforce strict network segmentation, restrict lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMI), mandate MFA, and maintain air-gapped backups.
How do I remove Dico from Windows?
Manual removal of Dico is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
What are the main symptoms of a Dico infection?
Symptoms of Dico can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Ransomwares
Want to prevent Dico and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Ransomware Containment & Incident Response.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/dico.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.