Coinstealer

Overview

Coinstealer (cataloged across threat intelligence databases and security vendors under signatures including Trojan:Win32/Coinstealer, Trojan:Win32/Coinstealer!rfn, and Trojan.CoinStealer) is a specialized cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker and wallet theft trojan active since 2017. Distributed through malicious software cracks, cryptocurrency discussion forums, and trojanized mining utilities, Coinstealer runs covertly as a background process monitoring the Windows Clipboard using the SetClipboardViewer or AddClipboardFormatListener APIs. When the user copies a string matching regular expression patterns of cryptocurrency addresses (such as Bitcoin base58/bech32, Ethereum 0x hex format, Monero, or Litecoin), Coinstealer instantaneously substitutes the victim's destination address with an operator-controlled wallet address before the user pastes it into a transaction form. Additionally, Coinstealer searches local disk directories for wallet data files (such as wallet.dat, Electrum seeds, and Metamask browser extension vaults) and exfiltrates them to remote C2 endpoints over HTTP or Telegram bots.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Coinstealer
• Trojan:Win32/Coinstealer!rfn
• Trojan.CoinStealer
• Win32/Coinstealer
• CryptoStealer

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Clipboard Crypto Stealer Engine

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Coinstealer.Btc · Coinstealer.Multi

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 90123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
• 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0

Delivery vectors

• nicehash_miner_optimization_patch.exe
• metamask_wallet_updater.exe

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\CryptoClipboardHelper

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_COINSTEALER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Coinstealer"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "coinstealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/coinstealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan:win32/coinstealer!rfn" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.coinstealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/coinstealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "cryptostealer" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Coinstealer (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: ec4e7b89-3e09-592d-b215-74ecf0c70c3a
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Coinstealer malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting,
  master key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/coinstealer
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1115
- attack.t1555_004
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_COINSTEALER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Coinstealer tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "coinstealer" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Instantly isolate the endpoint from the network to halt the exfiltration of the `wallet.dat` files or seed phrases.
2. If the user has not yet entered their master password to unlock a stolen (but encrypted) wallet, advise them to immediately move funds using a different, clean device.
3. Capture a forensic memory image to identify the specific C2 server the stolen wallets were sent to.
4. Assume all locally saved passwords and seed phrases have been compromised; a complete OS rebuild is necessary to ensure clipboard hijackers are removed.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow the user to perform any cryptocurrency transactions on the infected machine, as the clipboard hijacker will steal the funds.
2. Avoid assuming the threat is contained just by running a basic AV scan; the exfiltrated wallet data must be considered compromised.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Trojan:Win32/Coinstealer
• Malwarebytes Labs Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan.CoinStealer
• Search "coinstealer" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "coinstealer" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "coinstealer" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Infostealer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Bypass
• Banspy
• Allinonekeylogger
• Steam
• Msilperseus
• Azorult
• Stealc
• Agenttesla

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/coinstealer.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.