Nymeria
Table of Contents
Overview
Nymeria (cataloged across security vendors as TrojanDownloader:Win32/Nymeria, Trojan.Nymeria, and Backdoor:Win32/Nymeria) is a modular Windows trojan downloader and reconnaissance threat active since 2016. Often observed acting as a multi-stage loader or dropper in campaigns delivering commercial remote access tools (such as LodaRAT) and credential stealers, Nymeria infiltrates endpoints through malicious spearphishing email attachments, weaponized Office macro documents, and trojanized freeware downloads. Upon initial execution, Nymeria drops a copy of its executable stub into hidden user directories (such as %LocalAppData%\Temp or %AppData%) and establishes persistence via Windows Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks. The malware deploys in-memory anti-debugging and virtual machine detection routines to verify that it is running in a live user environment rather than an analysis sandbox. Once cleared, Nymeria captures system reconnaissance data (hostname, user privilege level, OS architecture) and initiates encrypted HTTP/HTTPS beaconing to remote command-and-control servers to download, unpack, and launch secondary payloads including info-stealers, keyloggers, and banking trojans.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Modular Windows Downloader Trojans
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Nymeria.A · Nymeria Loader V2
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Command and Control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1566.001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | Initial Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1055 | Process Injection | Defense Evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Defense Evasion | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1053.005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task | Persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.
- T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-BDA | Binary De-obfuscation & Unpacking | Analyze | T1027 | Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation. |
D3-STM | Scheduled Task Creation Analysis | Detect | T1053.005 | Audit task creation targeting system and hidden service directories; verify task author credentials. |
D3-PIAD | Process Injection Analysis & Detection | Detect | T1055 | Monitor cross-process thread creation (CreateRemoteThread) and asynchronous procedure calls (QueueUserAPC). |
D3-NTI | Network Traffic Inspection | Detect | T1105 | Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
D3-FS | File Sandboxing (Attachment Detonation) | Isolate | T1566.001 | Detonate macro-enabled documents, ISOs, and password-protected archives inside an isolated hypervisor. |
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c
Delivery vectors
Malicious email attachments disguised as invoices or receiptsDeceptive software downloads from third-party distribution portals
Persistence mechanisms
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\NymeriaUpdateScheduled Task executing dropped loader from %LocalAppData%\Temp
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_NYMERIA_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Nymeria"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "nymeria" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "trojandownloader:win32/nymeria" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan.nymeria" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "win32/nymeria" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "backdoor:win32/nymeria" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Nymeria (Downloader) Execution & Triage
id: bf4a1235-748f-5a43-ae13-720f115e1020
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Nymeria malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/nymeria
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.downloader
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1566_001
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1027
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \wscript.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- AppData\Local\Temp
- -WindowStyle Hidden
- /e:jscript
- bitsadmin /transfer
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_NYMERIA_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Nymeria tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "nymeria" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Immediately isolate the compromised endpoint from internal networks to prevent secondary malware staging and credential exfiltration.
- Capture a volatile memory image to preserve injected downloader threads, active socket connections, and decrypted C2 domains.
- Inspect the Windows Task Scheduler and Registry Run keys to eliminate persistent autostart entries referencing %Temp% binaries.
- Audit all corporate user accounts authenticated on the endpoint and enforce immediate password resets.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not close the incident merely because the initial Nymeria file was quarantined; always verify if secondary payloads executed.
- Avoid allowing non-whitelisted executable binaries to run directly from the Windows %Temp% and %AppData% directories.
References & External Analysis
- Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - TrojanDownloader:Win32/Nymeria
- PCRisk Threat Research - Trojan.Nymeria Analysis
- Search "nymeria" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "nymeria" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "nymeria" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is TrojanDownloader:Win32/Nymeria?
Nymeria is a Windows trojan downloader that stages secondary malware such as keyloggers, remote access tools, and password stealers.
How does Nymeria infect user workstations?
It spreads via spearphishing emails with weaponized attachments (Office documents, ZIP archives) and trojanized freeware installers.
Which secondary threats are commonly dropped by Nymeria?
It is frequently observed staging Remote Access Trojans (like LodaRAT), infostealers, banking trojans, and credential harvesters.
How does Nymeria evade detection by security software?
It checks for hypervisor and sandbox artifacts, runs memory-resident unpacking routines, and executes from temporary user directories.
What remediation steps should be taken following a Nymeria alert?
Isolate the endpoint, review network proxy logs to block C2 servers, run offline antimalware remediation, and reset account credentials.
How do I remove the Nymeria Downloader from Windows?
Manual removal of Nymeria is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Nymeria a virus or a Downloader?
Nymeria is classified as a Downloader. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Nymeria typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Nymeria infection?
Symptoms of Nymeria can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Downloaders
Want to prevent Nymeria and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Downloader & Dropper Protection.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/nymeria.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.