Ausiv

Category: trojan · Aliases: Trojan:Win32/Ausiv, Worm:Win32/Ausiv, Trojan.Win32.Ausiv, Win32/Ausiv.A, Ausiv.Worm · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 422 · Enrichment: curated_sourced · Updated: 2026-10-14
Category: TrojanStatus: Automated SignaturePlatform: WINDOWS_PEStage: Execution, PersistenceFirst seen: 2011Actor: Unknown / CybercriminalIndustry: Global / OpportunisticMotivation: Financial Theft🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows 7
Executive Summary
Ausiv (cataloged across security vendors as Trojan:Win32/Ausiv, Worm:Win32/Ausiv, and Trojan.Win32.Ausiv) is a hybrid Windows trojan and worm framework that emerged around 2011.

Table of Contents

Overview

Ausiv (cataloged across security vendors as Trojan:Win32/Ausiv, Worm:Win32/Ausiv, and Trojan.Win32.Ausiv) is a hybrid Windows trojan and worm framework that emerged around 2011. Engineered for persistent secondary malware delivery and lateral network spread, Ausiv attempts to replicate across mapped network shares and removable USB media while maintaining command-and-control connectivity with attacker servers. Upon initial execution, Ausiv creates hidden directories within %APPDATA%, drops its payload binary, and modifies registry autostart keys. The malware periodically polls C2 servers over HTTP/TCP to download secondary ransomware, spyware, or adware components, while scanning local subnets and removable drives for write permissions to drop autorun and shortcut LNK files exploiting CVE-2010-2568.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Win32 Worm Loader Engines

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Ausiv.A · Ausiv.B · Ausiv.Worm

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-PBAProcess Spawn AnalysisDetectT1059.003Inspect command-line arguments and anomalous parent-child relationships spawning from cmd.exe.
D3-WAFWeb Content Filtering & InspectionFilterT1071.001Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles.
D3-FDAFile Directory Access AuditingDetectT1083Audit and alert on high-frequency recursive directory queries executed by non-system and unclassified binaries.
D3-NTINetwork Traffic InspectionDetectT1105Inspect deep packet payloads for anomalous staging binaries and unauthorized egress protocols.
D3-RPMRegistry Persistence MonitoringDetectT1547.001Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management.

Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

Delivery vectors

Persistence mechanisms

SIEM / EDR Ingestion: Need these reference indicators for threat hunting?

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_AUSIV_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Ausiv"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "ausiv" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/ausiv" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "worm:win32/ausiv" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.win32.ausiv" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/ausiv.a" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "ausiv.worm" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Ausiv (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: 0ac167d8-5a67-5f70-92f7-9934a66fb591
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Ausiv malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/ausiv
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1071_001
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1083
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_AUSIV_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Ausiv tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "ausiv" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

Containment & Response Steps

Home Users: If you suspect a malware infection on your personal device, disconnect from the internet immediately and run a full system scan with your antivirus software (see our TotalAV Antivirus & Security Support Guide). The steps below are intended for IT professionals responding to enterprise incidents.

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

  1. Isolate infected hosts and disconnect mapped network drives immediately to halt worm propagation.
  2. Terminate malicious Ausiv processes and remove dropped files from %APPDATA% and %TEMP% folders.
  3. Delete persistence registry entries under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
  4. Scan and disinfect connected USB flash drives and external storage media.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

  1. Do not connect infected USB flash drives to uninfected administrative workstations.
  2. Avoid leaving open, unauthenticated SMB write shares accessible across enterprise subnets.

References & External Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Ausiv malware family?

Ausiv is a hybrid Windows trojan and worm that spreads via removable drives and downloads secondary payloads.

How does Ausiv spread across local environments?

It copies itself to connected USB flash drives and open network shares using weaponized shortcut LNK files.

What actions does Ausiv perform once active?

It establishes registry persistence, beacons to C2 servers, and downloads secondary malware payloads.

Which CVE vulnerabilities have been linked to Ausiv propagation?

Ausiv leverages Windows shortcut parsing flaws including CVE-2010-2568 and document flaws like CVE-2012-0158.

How can systems be defended against Ausiv?

Disable AutoRun on USB drives, restrict SMB network write access, and deploy endpoint antimalware protection.

How do I remove Ausiv from Windows?

Manual removal of Ausiv is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

What are the main symptoms of a Ausiv infection?

Symptoms of Ausiv can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against Trojans

Want to prevent Ausiv and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Banking Trojan Protection for Businesses.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/ausiv.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.