Lost_Door
Table of Contents
Overview
Lost Door (cataloged across security software as Backdoor.LostDoor, Trojan.Win32.LostDoor, and Backdoor:Win32/LostDoor) is a classic Delphi-authored Remote Access Trojan (RAT) created in 2007 by an underground developer known as 'Türkojan' / 'Lost_Door'. Widely adopted across global cybercriminal forums, Lost Door provides full remote administrative control over compromised Windows endpoints. Its capabilities include real-time desktop screen capture, webcam surveillance, audio recording, reverse command shells, registry editing, active process management, and automated password extraction from web browsers, email clients, and instant messengers. Lost Door was commonly distributed through peer-to-peer file sharing networks, malicious email attachments, and trojanized freeware software bundles.
Known aliases
Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:
Family Pedigree & Lineage
Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:
Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Delphi Rat Frameworks
Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Lost Door V6.0 · Lost Door V8.0 · Lost Door Fly Edition
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Official Spec |
|---|---|---|---|
T1056.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | Credential Access | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1113 | Screen Capture | Collection | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1125 | Video Capture | Collection | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1123 | Audio Capture | Collection | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1059.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | Execution | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control | ATT&CK ↗ |
T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence | ATT&CK ↗ |
Tactical Mitigations
Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:
- T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
- T1059.003: Restrict execution of Windows Command Shell (cmd.exe) and block unauthorized batch scripts.
- T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
- T1113: Monitor for frequent or unauthorized screen captures or clipboard reads. Restrict background applications from accessing desktop APIs.
- T1125: Restrict access to local camera or microphone APIs. Utilize endpoint protection that monitors hardware access.
MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures
Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):
| D3FEND ID | Countermeasure Name | Tactic | Countered ATT&CK | Defensive Guidance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
D3-MFA | Multi-factor Authentication | Harden | T1056.001 | Enforce FIDO2 / WebAuthn physical tokens to render keystroke-intercepted passwords useless. |
D3-PBA | Process Spawn Analysis | Detect | T1059.003 | Inspect command-line arguments and anomalous parent-child relationships spawning from cmd.exe. |
D3-WAF | Web Content Filtering & Inspection | Filter | T1071.001 | Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles. |
D3-SD | Screen Capture Detection | Detect | T1113 | Monitor desktop graphics API calls (BitBlt, GetDC) triggered by non-standard background threads. |
D3-HAC | Hardware Device Access Control | Isolate | T1125 | Enforce Group Policy hardware access restrictions on integrated webcams and microphones. |
D3-RPM | Registry Persistence Monitoring | Detect | T1547.001 | Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management. |
Exploited Vulnerabilities (CVEs)
This malware family is documented weaponizing the following common vulnerabilities and exposures:
- CVE-2010-2568 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
- CVE-2012-0158 — In-depth exploitation analysis and catalog intelligence (NIST NVD ↗).
Indicators of Compromise
Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.
File hashes (SHA-256, sample)
Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.
3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b
Delivery vectors
Peer-to-peer file sharing networks disguised as software cracks and game cheat toolsPhishing emails with malicious Microsoft Office attachments exploiting CVE-2012-0158
Persistence mechanisms
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\LostDoorServerStartup folder shortcut in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)
Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:
Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)
Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.
rule MALWARE_WIN_LOST_DOOR_T1_ARTIFACT {
meta:
description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Lost_Door"
tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
$s1 = "lost_door" ascii wide nocase
$s2 = "backdoor.lostdoor" ascii wide nocase
$s3 = "trojan.win32.lostdoor" ascii wide nocase
$s4 = "backdoor:win32/lostdoor" ascii wide nocase
$s5 = "win32/lostdoor.rat" ascii wide nocase
$s6 = "lostdoor.e-server" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}
Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)
Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.
title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Lost_door (Rat) Execution & Triage
id: 4780a5f4-5fbb-58f3-9985-031cfc4ddfc5
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
with the Lost_door malware family. Detects unauthorized persistence creation via
Windows Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and privilege escalation indicative
of RAT installations.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/lost_door
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/backdoor-rat-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.rat
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1125
- attack.t1123
- attack.t1059_003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith:
- \reg.exe
- \schtasks.exe
- \cmd.exe
- \powershell.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- \CurrentVersion\Run
- /create /tn
- bypass -enc
- net user /add
- net localgroup administrators
condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high
Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)
Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.
rule MALWARE_WIN_LOST_DOOR_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
meta:
description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Lost_Door tradecraft"
tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
date = "2026-10-14"
strings:
// Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
$attrib_str = "lost_door" ascii wide nocase
$pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
$net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
Containment & Response Steps
Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.
- Isolate compromised endpoints to cut active remote command sessions and stop live webcam/desktop streaming.
- Kill active Lost Door server processes and remove autostart entries.
- Purge persistence registry entries located under HKLM and HKCU Run keys.
- Perform an enterprise-wide password reset for all user accounts accessed from the infected workstation.
What to Avoid
Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.
- Do not execute software downloaded from unverified peer-to-peer file sharing repositories or forum links.
- Avoid continuing operation of a compromised endpoint without thorough forensic memory triage.
References & External Analysis
- Kaspersky Threat Intelligence - Backdoor.Win32.LostDoor
- Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - Backdoor.Win32.LostDoor
- NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2010-2568
- Search "lost_door" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
- Search "lost_door" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
- Search "lost_door" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the Lost Door remote access trojan?
Lost Door is a modular Delphi Remote Access Trojan developed in 2007 providing full interactive surveillance and remote control.
What surveillance modules are included in Lost Door?
Modules include live webcam capture, microphone eavesdropping, keystroke logging, screen viewing, and password theft.
How was Lost Door propagated across victim systems?
It was distributed through peer-to-peer file sharing networks, IRC chat file transfers, and trojanized gaming cracks.
Which CVE vulnerabilities have been linked to Lost Door delivery?
Campaigns delivering Lost Door droppers have exploited shortcut and document flaws including CVE-2010-2568 and CVE-2012-0158.
How can systems be defended against Lost Door?
Enforce firewall egress filtering, deploy endpoint antimalware protection, and monitor registry Run keys and active sockets.
How do I remove the Lost_Door Rat from Windows?
Manual removal of Lost_Door is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.
Is Lost_Door a virus or a Rat?
Lost_Door is classified as a Rat. Unlike traditional viruses that infect files, modern malware like Lost_Door typically operates as a standalone payload designed to compromise systems, steal data, or deploy secondary stage implants.
What are the main symptoms of a Lost_Door infection?
Symptoms of Lost_Door can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.
Protect Your Network Against Rats
Want to prevent Lost_Door and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Backdoor & RAT Protection for Businesses.
📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?
Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.
Machine-readable
Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/lost_door.json
Ecosystem & Interactive Environments
This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.