Mansabo

Overview

Mansabo (cataloged by security researchers and antivirus engines under signatures including Trojan:Win32/Mansabo, Trojan.Win32.Mansabo, and Trojan:Win32/Mansabo!MSR) is a covert surveillance trojan and second-stage payload delivery agent first identified in 2015. Developed to target enterprise and consumer Windows workstations, Mansabo is commonly delivered via spearphishing attachments containing weaponized macros, cracked commercial software packages, and drive-by downloads from compromised websites. Once resident on a victim machine, Mansabo deploys advanced reconnaissance routines to query host network configuration, running processes, and installed security software. The malware features integrated surveillance modules capable of logging keystrokes, capturing screenshots during user desktop activity, and harvesting stored browser credentials and system tokens. Furthermore, Mansabo serves as an initial access stager, communicating over encrypted HTTP/HTTPS channels with attacker-controlled command-and-control servers to download and execute secondary post-exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike beacons, ransomware precursors, and network discovery tools.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Mansabo
• Trojan.Win32.Mansabo
• Trojan:Win32/Mansabo!MSR
• Win32/Mansabo

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Generic Win32 Trojan Stealers

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Mansabo.A · Mansabo.Msr

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• 9a7c3b8e1f0d4a2c5e6b7a8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f
• b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2

Delivery vectors

• invoice_doc_scan.exe
• mansabo_update.exe

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WinMansabo
• %AppData%\Mansabo\svchost_task.exe

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_MANSABO_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Mansabo"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "mansabo" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/mansabo" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan.win32.mansabo" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan:win32/mansabo!msr" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/mansabo" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Mansabo (Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: c2b86107-551d-52f9-9fa2-eda32bb7add1
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Mansabo malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/mansabo
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/downloader-dropper-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1566_001
- attack.t1204_002
- attack.t1059_003
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1056_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_MANSABO_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Mansabo tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "mansabo" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Instantly isolate the endpoint from the network to halt the active exfiltration of the harvested credential archives.
2. Force a global, mandatory password reset for the compromised user, prioritizing corporate VPN access, email accounts, and financial portals.
3. Capture a full forensic memory image to extract the active Mansabo payload and identify the specific C2 infrastructure it is communicating with.
4. Assume all locally saved passwords have been compromised; perform a clean OS rebuild to ensure the infostealer is completely eradicated.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow the user to type any passwords or access sensitive portals while the machine is infected, as the infostealer may include keylogging capabilities.
2. Avoid assuming the threat is contained just by removing the executable; the exfiltrated passwords must be reset globally.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Trojan:Win32/Mansabo!MSR
• Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Portal - Trojan.Win32.Mansabo
• Search "mansabo" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "mansabo" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "mansabo" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Trojan)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Xrat
• Gamsoft
• Fakedos
• Pcfixer
• Korplug
• Loki
• Brosafe
• Browshot

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/mansabo.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.