Clipbanker

Category: banking_trojan · Aliases: Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClipBanker, Trojan:Win32/ClipBanker, Trojan.ClipBanker, Win32/ClipBanker, ClipBanker.Gen, Trojan-Banker:Win32/ClipBanker.A · Sample count (EMBER 2018): 35 · Enrichment: curated_sourced · Updated: 2026-10-15
Category: Banking_TrojanStatus: Automated SignatureFirst seen: 2015Motivation: Direct Financial Theft & Cryptocurrency Expropriation🕸 Explore Relationship Graph⚙ API JSON⚡ Sigma Rule💾 YARA RuleOS: Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows 8.1
Executive Summary
Clipbanker (extensively cataloged across threat intelligence databases and antivirus vendors under signatures including Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClipBanker, Trojan:Win32/ClipBanker, and Trojan.ClipBanker) is a notorious family of financial trojans and cryptocurrency clipboard hijackers active since 2015.

Table of Contents

Overview

Clipbanker (extensively cataloged across threat intelligence databases and antivirus vendors under signatures including Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClipBanker, Trojan:Win32/ClipBanker, and Trojan.ClipBanker) is a notorious family of financial trojans and cryptocurrency clipboard hijackers active since 2015. Operating silently on infected endpoints, Clipbanker monitors the Windows clipboard using native API hooks (SetClipboardViewer or AddClipboardFormatListener). Whenever a user copies a string of text, Clipbanker runs regular expression algorithms to detect cryptocurrency wallet addresses (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero, Litecoin, Ripple) or European bank account numbers (IBANs). The moment a target address is detected, Clipbanker instantly substitutes it with a preconfigured attacker-controlled wallet or account address. Because users rarely verify every character of long hexadecimal crypto addresses before clicking 'Send', funds are irreversibly transferred directly to the threat actor.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Trojan-Banker.Win32.Clipbanker.A · Trojan-Banker.Win32.Clipbanker.Gen · Cryptoclipbanker

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

This family has been observed using the following ATT&CK techniques: T1115 · T1547.001 · T1082 · T1027 · T1071.001

→ Explore the complete 226-Technique ATT&CK Threat Matrix

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

D3FEND IDCountermeasure NameTacticCountered ATT&CKDefensive Guidance
D3-BDABinary De-obfuscation & UnpackingAnalyzeT1027Utilize memory dump scanners and entropy inspection to unpack encrypted stagers during process creation.
D3-WAFWeb Content Filtering & InspectionFilterT1071.001Block newly registered domains (NRDs) and inspect HTTP Host and URI headers for known C2 profiles.
D3-SDASystem Discovery AnalysisDetectT1082Alert on rapid enumerations of systeminfo, hostname, and registry hardware trees in short intervals.
D3-CACClipboard Access ControlIsolateT1115Isolate virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) clipboards and alert on rapid background clipboard querying by non-foreground processes.
D3-RPMRegistry Persistence MonitoringDetectT1547.001Audit and restrict write privileges to user and machine-level Registry Run/RunOnce keys using Endpoint Privilege Management.

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

Tier 1 Primitive Artifact Rule (Fast Triage)

Matches raw strings and file markers. Vulnerable to binary repacking and simple obfuscation.

rule MALWARE_WIN_CLIPBANKER_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Clipbanker"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan-banker.win32.clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojan:win32/clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "clipbanker.gen" ascii wide nocase
        $s7 = "trojan-banker:win32/clipbanker.a" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

Tier 2 Behavioral Context Rule (Process Chains & Sigma)

Tracks parent-child process anomalies and suspicious scripting telemetry. Resilient against file renames.

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Clipbanker (Banking Trojan) Execution & Triage
id: afec24a9-d16d-5361-9521-8b4b76448264
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Clipbanker malware family. Detects recon staging, certutil file payload
  staging, and web-inject process proxying characteristic of banking trojan initial
  loaders.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/clipbanker
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/banking-trojan-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.banking-trojan
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1115
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1082
- attack.t1027
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \svchost.exe
    - \explorer.exe
    - \msiexec.exe
    - \certutil.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - -urlcache
    - -split -f
    - ipconfig /all
    - route print
    - netstat -ano
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint Rule (High Fidelity)

Deep signature matching distinctive operational fingerprints and payload characteristics.

rule MALWARE_WIN_CLIPBANKER_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Clipbanker tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "clipbanker" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}
SOC & SIEM Rule Downloads: ⬇ Download YARA Rule (.yar) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (YAML) ⬇ Download Sigma Rule (JSON) ⚙ Threat Profile API (JSON)

References & External Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClipBanker?

Clipbanker is a clipboard-hijacking trojan that replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses and bank account numbers with attacker-controlled destinations.

How does Clipbanker steal cryptocurrency funds?

It intercepts Windows clipboard operations in real time using regex matching, swapping the victim's intended destination wallet address with an attacker wallet during copy-paste.

What cryptocurrency formats does Clipbanker target?

It commonly targets Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), Litecoin (LTC), Monero (XMR), Ripple (XRP), and European IBAN bank accounts.

Why is Clipbanker difficult for users to notice?

It generates virtually zero CPU overhead, does not display any user interface, and relies on users failing to double-check long cryptographic strings before approving transfers.

How can users protect cryptocurrency transactions from Clipbanker?

Always verify the first and last five characters of crypto wallet addresses before sending, use hardware wallets with on-device address confirmation, and maintain updated antivirus protection.

How do I remove Clipbanker from Windows?

Manual removal of Clipbanker is highly discouraged as it may leave persistence mechanisms intact. We recommend disconnecting the device from the internet and utilizing a professional incident response service or enterprise-grade EDR software to conduct a full forensic sweep.

What are the main symptoms of a Clipbanker infection?

Symptoms of Clipbanker can include unexpected system slowness, unauthorized outbound network traffic to unknown IP addresses, disabled security software, and suspicious background processes running from AppData or Temp directories.

Protect Your Network Against Banking_Trojans

Want to prevent Clipbanker and similar threats from compromising your organization? Read our comprehensive defensive guide: Banking Trojan Protection for Businesses.

📣 Threat Intel Correction or Update?

Notice an outdated IOC, unlisted alias, or disputed attribution? Threat researchers are invited to propose an update on GitHub or contact the SystemHelpDesk research desk. All community revisions are credited in our public CHANGELOG.

Need help with an active incident? Published by the SystemHelpdesk Threat Intelligence Team.

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/clipbanker.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.