Dimnie

Overview

Dimnie (first discovered in 2014 and thoroughly analyzed by security firms including Palo Alto Networks Unit 42) is an evasive modular infostealer and intelligence-gathering trojan. Operating primarily in memory to avoid writing artifacts to disk, Dimnie features multi-layered encryption and anti-analysis routines that evade debuggers and sandbox hypervisors. Dimnie is equipped with specialized plugins: a memory scraper for harvesting credentials, an audio and screen recording module, a PowerShell execution engine, a keylogger, and network traffic exfiltration modules that disguise outbound stolen data within benign-looking HTTP requests, GitHub commits, or DNS queries.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Dimnie
• PWS:Win32/Dimnie
• Trojan.Dimnie
• Dimnie Stealer
• Win32/Dimnie

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1056.001: Implement Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) to monitor for suspicious API calls related to keystroke interception. Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) to render stolen passwords useless.
• T1566.001: Scan email attachments for malicious macros, scripts, or suspicious archive files.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_DIMNIE_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Dimnie"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "dimnie" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/dimnie" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "pws:win32/dimnie" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.dimnie" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "dimnie stealer" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/dimnie" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Dimnie (Infostealer) Execution & Triage
id: fb1f7292-bb7e-5b07-bb4a-3ea09de7b5e1
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Dimnie malware family. Detects browser credential database harvesting,
  master key queries, and DPAPI extraction routines typical of modern infostealers.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/dimnie
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/infostealer-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.infostealer
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1056_001
- attack.t1113
- attack.t1125
- attack.t1059_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \rundll32.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data
    - \AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles
    - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User Data
    - vaultcmd.exe /list
    - dpapi
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: high

rule MALWARE_WIN_DIMNIE_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Dimnie tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "dimnie" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Instantly isolate the endpoint; an active Dimnie infection means an advanced threat actor is actively stealing source code and credentials.
2. Assume all local credentials, SSH keys, GitHub tokens, and AWS access keys present on the machine are compromised. Revoke them immediately.
3. Capture a full forensic memory image (RAM dump) to extract the fileless espionage plugins and determine exactly what data was targeted for exfiltration.
4. Perform a complete bare-metal rebuild of the operating system; fileless malware leaves persistence hooks that are extremely difficult to guarantee removed.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not assume the code repositories accessed by the victim are safe; audit all recent commits made by the compromised user for malicious injections.
2. Avoid relying on standard antivirus scans, as Dimnie's core logic and plugins exist almost entirely in volatile memory.

References & External Analysis

• Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 - Dimnie Trojan Analysis
• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/Dimnie
• MITRE ATT&CK - Process Injection (T1055)
• Search "dimnie" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "dimnie" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "dimnie" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Infostealer)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Chisburg
• Azorult
• Browserpassview
• Advpassman
• Adspy
• Lynx
• Atraps
• Berbew

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/dimnie.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.