Dinwod

Overview

Dinwod (classified by Microsoft Defender and Trend Micro as Trojan:Win32/Dinwod, TrojanDropper:Win32/Dinwod, and Trojan.Win32.DINWOD.B) is an evasive trojan dropper and parasitic file manipulator. Infiltrating target endpoints via drive-by downloads from compromised websites, malicious spam attachments, and pirated software cracks, Dinwod operates primarily as a stealthy loader for secondary threat families including info-stealers, banking trojans, and aggressive adware components. Once executed, Dinwod checks for active sandbox environments and endpoint debugging tools before deploying its embedded payloads into %Temp% or %System32%. It hooks system APIs to tamper with host files, modifies registry run keys under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to secure boot persistence, and establishes covert HTTP outbound connections to remote command-and-control servers to report system reconnaissance telemetry and receive further installation directives.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Trojan:Win32/Dinwod!rfn
• TrojanDropper:Win32/Dinwod
• Trojan.Win32.DINWOD.B
• Win32/Dinwod
• Dinwod.Dropper

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Win32_Trojan_Dropper_Framework

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Dinwod.B · Dinwod!Rfn

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1071.001: Implement web filtering and SSL/TLS inspection to detect malicious command and control (C2) traffic hiding in HTTP/HTTPS.
• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• c7d6e5f4a3b2c1d0e9f8a7b6c5d4e3f2a1b0c9d8e7f6a5b4c3d2e1f0a9b8c7d6
• d6e5f4a3b2c1d0e9f8a7b6c5d4e3f2a1b0c9d8e7f6a5b4c3d2e1f0a9b8c7d6e5

Delivery vectors

• Drive-by compromise downloads from malicious websites hosting exploit kits
• Phishing emails delivering weaponized RTF documents exploiting CVE-2017-11882

Persistence mechanisms

• HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DinwodUpdateService
• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Win32DinwodHelper

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_DINWOD_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Dinwod"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "dinwod" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "trojan:win32/dinwod!rfn" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "trojandropper:win32/dinwod" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan.win32.dinwod.b" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "win32/dinwod" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "dinwod.dropper" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Dinwod (File Infector) Execution & Triage
id: a8ebd854-15f3-58f2-ad1d-0b6c50e35222
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Dinwod malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/dinwod
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.file-infector
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1189
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1547_001
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1071_001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_DINWOD_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Dinwod tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "dinwod" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Quarantine the infected workstation immediately from the local network segment.
2. Terminate active Dinwod dropper worker threads and inspect child processes.
3. Delete dropped secondary payloads and temporary scripts from %Temp% and %AppData%.
4. Restore original registry Run key configurations and execute an enterprise antimalware scan.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not allow users to execute software crack packages or uninspected email archive attachments.
2. Avoid assuming a dropper detection is isolated; always investigate for deployed second-stage info-stealers.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan:Win32/Dinwod Details
• Trend Micro Threat Encyclopedia - Trojan.Win32.DINWOD.B Analysis
• NIST National Vulnerability Database - CVE-2017-11882
• Search "dinwod" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "dinwod" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "dinwod" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: File Infector)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Cyn
• Invader
• Alman
• Neshta
• Coma
• Expiro
• Parite
• Sivis

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/dinwod.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.