Indiloadz

Overview

Indiloadz (cataloged across security vendor detections as Adware:Win32/Indiloadz, PUA:Win32/Indiloadz, and Trojan:Win32/Indiloadz) is an invasive software download wrapper and Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA) family active since 2014. Deployed primarily through third-party freeware hosting portals, cracked software repositories, and deceptive streaming websites, Indiloadz acts as a monetized installation stub. When users attempt to download legitimate software utilities or multimedia files, they are served an Indiloadz wrapper executable instead. Upon execution, the wrapper utilizes deceptive UI dark patterns—such as obfuscated decline buttons and pre-checked consent toggles—to quietly download and install multiple secondary payloads, including intrusive browser extensions, search redirectors, and adware toolbars. Indiloadz establishes autostart persistence via Windows Registry Run keys, monitors browser activity, injects unwanted pop-up advertisements into web pages, and exfiltrates endpoint browsing telemetry to remote monetization networks.

Known aliases

Threat reports may refer to this family under multiple names:

• Adware:Win32/Indiloadz
• PUA:Win32/Indiloadz
• Trojan:Win32/Indiloadz
• PUA.Indiloadz
• Win32/Indiloadz

Family Pedigree & Lineage

Malware authors regularly fork and iterate upon existing codebases. Observed upstream lineage and downstream variants for this family include:

Derived From / Upstream Ancestry: Pay-Per-Install Download Wrapper · Deceptive Software Bundler Engine

Known Derivatives & Downstream Variants: Indiloadz.A · Indiloadz.Gen · Indiloadz.Msr

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Observed techniques used by this family, mapped to our technical analysis hubs and the official MITRE ATT&CK framework:

Tactical Mitigations

Based on the techniques used by this family, consider the following defensive strategies:

• T1105: Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host-based firewalls to block unauthorized inbound or outbound file transfers.

MITRE D3FEND™ Defensive Countermeasures

Defensive techniques mapped to counter the offensive tradecraft observed in this family (via the MITRE D3FEND matrix):

Indicators of Compromise

Public indicators drawn from CISA advisories and vendor reporting. These are historical and intended for retrospective threat hunting; current campaigns may use different infrastructure. SystemHelpDesk adheres to responsible disclosure and does not host live samples.

File hashes (SHA-256, sample)

Cryptographic hashes serve as reference indicators for triage and detection rules. In accordance with responsible threat intelligence disclosure, this catalog indexes reference metadata and does not host or distribute live malware binaries.

• b5d7f9a1c3e5b7d9f1a3c5e7b9d1f3a5c7e9b1d3f5a7c9e1b3d5f7a9c1e3b5d7
• c6e8b0d2f4a6c8e0b2d4f6a8b0c2d4e6f8a0b2c4d6e8f0a2b4c6d8e0f2a4c6e8

Delivery vectors

• Deceptive download wrappers on third-party freeware hosting websites
• Bundled installers for cracked multimedia utilities and game patches

Persistence mechanisms

• HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Indiloadz
• %LOCALAPPDATA%\Indiloadz\indiloadz.exe

Tiered Detection Rules (Cisco CAIRN Model)

Modern threat detection requires multi-layered rule engineering. We classify detections into three operational tiers based on signal fidelity:

rule MALWARE_WIN_INDILOADZ_T1_ARTIFACT {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 1 Primitive Artifact: Raw string matches for Indiloadz"
        tier = "T1 - Primitive Artifact"
        confidence = "Low-Medium (Fast Triage)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        $s1 = "indiloadz" ascii wide nocase
        $s2 = "adware:win32/indiloadz" ascii wide nocase
        $s3 = "pua:win32/indiloadz" ascii wide nocase
        $s4 = "trojan:win32/indiloadz" ascii wide nocase
        $s5 = "pua.indiloadz" ascii wide nocase
        $s6 = "win32/indiloadz" ascii wide nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and any of them
}

title: SystemHelpDesk Detection - Indiloadz (Adware) Execution & Triage
id: 4a38399f-3b8f-5527-94c9-69c93a6dcf2d
status: production
description: Detects execution, defense evasion, and persistence behaviors associated
  with the Indiloadz malware family. Detects suspicious execution from temporary user
  directories with hidden window flags and background transfer utilities.
references:
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/families/indiloadz
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/defensive/ransomware-protection
- https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/
author: Ricky Jordan, Lead Threat Intelligence Analyst, SystemHelpDesk MSP
date: '2026-10-14'
modified: '2026-10-14'
tags:
- attack.adware
- author.ricky-jordan
- source.systemhelpdesk-mfc
- attack.t1204_002
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1562_001
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1176
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_process:
    Image|endswith:
    - \cmd.exe
    - \powershell.exe
    - \cscript.exe
    - \wscript.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
    - AppData\Local\Temp
    - -WindowStyle Hidden
    - /e:jscript
    - bitsadmin /transfer
  condition: selection_process
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise administrative scripts during approved change windows
- Authorized IT software deployment utilities and backup management agents
level: medium

rule MALWARE_WIN_INDILOADZ_T3_ATTRIBUTION {
    meta:
        description = "Tier 3 Attribution Fingerprint: Heuristic detection for Indiloadz tradecraft"
        tier = "T3 - Attribution Fingerprint"
        confidence = "High (Confirmed Family Signature)"
        author = "SystemHelpdesk Threat Research Desk"
        date = "2026-10-14"
    strings:
        // Core family identifier & heuristic payload signatures
        $attrib_str = "indiloadz" ascii wide nocase
        $pe_magic = "MZ" ascii
        $net_marker = "http" ascii nocase
    condition:
        uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and ($attrib_str and $net_marker) and filesize < 15MB
}

Containment & Response Steps

Ordered checklist for responders. Adapt to your environment and engage professional support for active incidents.

1. Disconnect the affected endpoint from the network to halt secondary payload downloads and affiliate beaconing.
2. Inspect the Downloads folder and delete lingering wrapper setup executables.
3. Uninstall suspicious applications, search bars, and companion utilities installed on the compromise date.
4. Execute an on-demand antimalware scan using Microsoft Defender or Malwarebytes to remove residual registry keys and tasks.

What to Avoid

Common mistakes during response to this family that can destroy evidence, spread the infection, or worsen recovery.

1. Do not download files from portals that mandate the installation of proprietary download assistants.
2. Avoid clicking 'Quick' or 'Express' installation options; inspect custom setup settings to uncheck sponsored software.

References & External Analysis

• Microsoft Defender Security Intelligence - Adware:Win32/Indiloadz
• Malwarebytes Labs Threat Intelligence - PUA.Indiloadz
• Search "indiloadz" on VirusTotal (External Analysis)
• Search "indiloadz" on Any.Run (Sandbox Sandbox)
• Search "indiloadz" on MalwareBazaar (Malware Samples)

Frequently Asked Questions

Related Threats (Category: Adware)

Explore other documented threats in the same operational category:

• Hotbar
• Installerex
• Crossrider
• Mikey
• Installermonetizer
• Fusioncore
• Boilod
• Mailru

Machine-readable

Get this profile as JSON: https://malware-families-catalog.systemhelpdesk.com/api/indiloadz.json

Ecosystem & Interactive Environments

This profile is part of the Malware Families Catalog, a public dataset of 2,899 malware families. The catalog is also published across our ecosystem: Hugging Face, Kaggle, Zenodo, Replit, StackBlitz, CodeSandbox, and CodePen.